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Confederation-Era Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce and
the Legitimacy of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
Brannon P Denning'
It is an article of faith among critics of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
(DCCD) that it is utterly lacking in textual or historical support. Critics argue that
(I) the doctrine has no textualfoundation; (2) there is no indication that the Framers
intended the Supreme Court to read into thepositivegrant ofpower to Congress over
commerce any implicit, judicially enforceable restrictions on states; and (3) if indeed
such restrictions were intended, they were not widely understood to be there; for if
the public were to have had such an understanding it would have revolted against
such a restriction on state power Some critics have been so bold as to suggest that the
doctrine's provenance is so questionable that the Supreme Court ought to abandon
it once andfor all.
An even stronger version of this argument tracks a long-running dispute among
historians regarding the degree to which states actually discriminated against one
another during the Confederation period. Revisionist historians denied that any ap-
preciable discrimination took place and argued that states were actually cooperating
with one another, contrary to the standard account holding that a shooting war
would have eruptedfrom various commercial disputes among the new states. Strong
critics of the DCCD argue that this historical evidence shows the DCCD to be nothing
less than a constitutionalfraud.
In this work, I will demonstrate (i) that fears of present andfuture disputes among
states over interstate commerce occupied the minds of the Framers, who saw the need
for locating the power to regulate interstate commerce in Congress; (2) that this dis-
crimination was not the product of the fevered imagination of nationalists bent on
reining in the states, but that it really existed, and that it showed no signs of abating
on the eve of the Philadelphia Convention; (3) that the abuses of the Confederation
era were specifically addressed in the text of the Constitution; and (4) that the text of
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the Constitution and the history surrounding its adoption furnish an ample textual
and historical basis for much of the DCCD as it has developed.
TT is an article of faith among critics of the dormant Commerce Clause
Idoctrine (DCCD)-the name given to the judicially enforced restric-
tions on states' abilities to discriminate against or otherwise burden inter-
state commerce-that the doctrine is utterly lacking in textual or historical
support. Critics' arguments can be summarized as follows. First, the doc-
trine has no textual foundation.2 Second, there is no indication that the
Framers intended the Court to read into the positive grant of power to
Congress over commerce any implicit, judicially enforceable restrictions
on states.3 Third, if indeed such restrictions were intended, they were not
widely understood to be there; for if the public were to have had such an
understanding it would have revolted against such a restriction on state
power.4 Some critics have been so bold as to suggest that the doctrine's
provenance is so questionable that the Supreme Court ought to abandon it
once and for all.'
An even stronger version of this argument tracks a long-running dispute
among historians regarding the degree to which states actually discrimi-
nated against one another during the Confederation period.6 Revisionist
2 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 61o (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (DCCD has "no basis in the text of the Constitution"); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (calling the DCCD the "negative" Commerce Clause because it "does not
appear in the Constitution"); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 617 (arguing that the
DCCD "lacks a foundation or justification in either the Constitution's text or history"); seealso
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Richard
D. Friedman, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause out of Its Misery, 1z CARDOZO L. REV. 1745
(199i).
3 See, e.g., Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1215, iz6 (1994) (arguing the DCCD is "absolutely without support in the text of the
Constitution or the intent of the Framers").
4 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 264 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I think it beyond question that many
'apprehensions' would have been 'entertained' if supporters of the Constitution had hinted
that the Commerce Clause, despite its language, gave this Court the power it has since
assumed."); FELIX FRANKFURTER, TE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE
19 (Peter Smith Publisher 1978) (1937) (describing the DCCD as "an audacious doctrine,
which, one may be sure, would hardly have been publicly avowed in support of the adoption
of the Constitution").
5 See, e.g., Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 62-63 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that he will no longer enforce the DCCD because it "has no basis in the text of the
Constitution, makes little sense, and [is] virtually unworkable in application"; quoting Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 61o (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
6 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation andthe American Common Market, in REGULATION,
FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 15-20 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 198i). Kitch, citing the
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historians denied that any appreciable discrimination took place and main-
tained that states were actually cooperating with one another, contrary to
the standard account popularized by John Fiske in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, which held that a commercial war was waged among the new states.'
Embracing the revisionists' account, strong critics of the DCCD argue that,
given the lack of historical evidence to support Fiske's "Critical Period"
• . 8
thesis, the DCCD is nothing less than a constitutional fraud.
Given that the DCCD is one of the oldest continuously applied doc-
trines in American constitutional law, there is probably little real danger of
it being supplanted. However, given its potential to severely restrict state
regulation of everything from online automobile sales9 to state regulation
of garbage,'0 highway safety," and taxation 1-just to name a few areas in
which the DCCD looms large--doubts about its legitimacy should be put
to rest. If they cannot, then arguments for the doctrine's narrow applica-
tion-even its elimination-become more persuasive.
This work will demonstrate (i) that fears of present and future dis-
putes among states over interstate commerce occupied the minds of the
Framers, who saw the need for locating the power to regulate interstate
commerce in Congress; (2) that this discrimination was not the product of
the fevered imagination of nationalists bent on reining in the states, but
that it really existed, and that it showed no signs of abating on the eve of
the Philadelphia Convention; (3) that the abuses of the Confederation Era
were specifically addressed in the text of the Constitution; and (4) that the
text of the Constitution and the history surrounding its adoption furnish
an ample textual and historical basis for much of the DCCD as it has de-
veloped. Revisionist accounts of the Confederation period simply missed
examples of discrimination against interstate commerce present in state
commercial legislation of the Confederation period, downplayed the role
they played in stoking the fears of those concerned with national union, or
work of revisionist historians, has argued that there is but a single "recorded instance of one
state imposing a restriction on commerce coming from other states." Id. at 18. This led Kitch to
conclude that "[tihe theoretical arguments that decentralized authorities should be expected
to cooperate to facilitate freedom of trade appear to be confirmed by the experience under the
Articles of Confederation. The argument that this experience demonstrated the opposite...
has no support in primary source materials." Id. at 19. He then argued that the Constitution's
text provided less protection for trade than the Articles of Confederation, and that the Framers
left to Congress, not the courts, the job of establishing a national free market. Id. at 2o.
7 JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 1783-1789, at 144-45
(Boston, Houghton, Mifflin 1888).
8 See Kitch, supra note 6.
9 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001).
10 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
I I See, e.g., S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
12 See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell v. Alabama, 526 U.S. I6o (1999).
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minimized the role that the proposed Constitution played in ending that
discrimination.
Part I of this article describes the revisionist account of the Confederation
era, which minimized the extent of interstate commercial friction. Part II
offers an overview of the state of the economy during the Confederation.
The mid-178os brought on a severe depression, during which states scram-
bled to raise revenue. Imposts and duties on commerce became popular,
with nearly every state enacting some sort of impost or duty regime. These
conflicting trade regulation regimes began to cause consternation in mod-
erate nationalists like James Madison, who feared for the union. Their wor-
ries are described in part III and were instrumental in convincing Madison,
among others, that structural reform of the Articles of Confederation was
essential if the union was to survive.
A particular worry was that some states were targeting commerce com-
ing from other states, either products originating in other states or prod-
ucts imported from abroad by out-of-state merchants and transported into
neighboring states for sale. Part IV offers specific examples of state laws
which did precisely this, contrary to revisionists' claims that such economic
rivalry was exceptional and, as described in part V, that states were actually
beginning to cooperate to eliminate trade barriers by the late 1780s.
Part VI outlines the restrictions on state regulation of commerce the
Framers of the Constitution placed in that document-restrictions that
correspond precisely to the kinds of abuses seen under the Confederation.
In addition, contrary to those who assume that at state sovereignty's high
tide no support could be had for restrictions on state commercial regula-
tion, this article shows that many of these restrictions had origins in early
drafts of the Articles of Confederation.
Finally, part VII ties the textual and historical evidence back to the
DCCD as it presently exists. At a minimum, there is ample support for ju-
dicially enforced restrictions on state regulations that discriminate against
interstate commerce. Critics of the DCCD, I conclude, are obliged to con-
struct better historical and textual arguments to support their illegitimacy
thesis or must confine their criticisms to the doctrine's evolution.
I. "CRITICAL PERIOD" OR "TEAPOT TEMPEST"?
The "Critical Period" thesis, first made popular by historian John Fiske in
his 1888 book The Critical Period in American History: 1783-1789, held that
only the wisdom of that assemblage of demigods gathered in Philadelphia
in May 1787 saved the United States from being torn apart by civil war
spawned by the commercial jealousies that arose among the states, which
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the impotent Confederation Congress could not squelch. 3 In this telling,
granting Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was largely
seen as an effort to limit the states' power. Fiske's thesis has even found
its way into the Supreme Court's DCCD opinions. Justice Cardozo, for ex-
ample, wrote that the Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division."' 4 Justice
Robert Jackson, too, once penned what has been described as a "mytho-
poeic" tribute to economic nationalism in the 1949 case of H.P Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond.'" On occasion, the Court has even cited Fiske in
support of its conclusions that the Constitution was framed to end harmful
rivalries among states and inaugurate a new era of nationalist cooperation
in commercial matters.16
Beginning with Charles Beard, who charged that Fiske wrote "without
fear and without research,"'7 and Merrill Jensen, who pronounced Fiske's
work to be of "no value as either history or example," revisionist historians
13 See FISKE, supra note 7, at 144-54. Merrill Jensen, a vociferous critic of Fiske, para-
phrased the "Critical Period" thesis in his 195o history of the Confederation Period:
[Bly 1786 there was universal depression, trade had wellnigh stopped,
and political quackery with cheap and dirty remedies had full control
of the field. Trade disputes promised to end in war between states.
Territorial disputes led to bloodshed. War with Spain threatened.
The "league" [i.e., the Confederation] could not coerce its members.
Secession was threatened by some states. Congress had no money and
could borrow none. Courts were broken up by armed mobs.
MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789 xi (1950).
14 Baldwin v. G.A.F Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 51 I, 523 (1935).
15 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). For an analysis, see
Jack Michel, Comment, Hood v. Du Mond: A Study of the Supreme Court and the Ideology of
Capitalism, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 657, 683 (1986).
16 See, e.g., H.P Hood& Sons, 336 U.S. at 533 (citing Fiske in support of the proposition
that the Confederation period was marked by commercial strife that threatened the peace of
the Union); Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 94 (I947) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Fiske as a standard account of "[t]he unedifying story of Colonial rivalry in preying
upon commerce, which more than any one thing made our Federal Constitution a necessity");
see also Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 598-99 (1918), which cites Fiske in declaring:
That this absence of power to control the governmental attributes of
the States, for the purpose of enforcing findings concerning disputes be-
tween them, gave rise to the most serious consequences, and brought
the States to the very verge of physical struggle, and resulted in the
shedding of blood and would, if it had not been for the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, it may be reasonably assumed, have
rendered nugatory the great results of the Revolution, is known of all
and will be found stated in the authoritative works on the history of
the time.
17 JENSEN, supra note 13, at xii.
x8 Id. Even Andrew McLaughlin, who wrote that Fiske's "exceedingly interesting and
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charged that the standard account is simply not an accurate picture of the
Confederation period. Jensen wrote that "[n]o idea is more firmly planted
in American history than the idea that one of the most difficult problems
during the Confederation was that of barriers to trade between state and
state.' Though some barriers existed, like those that New Jersey and
Connecticut levied on goods brought in from neighboring colonies prior to
the Confederation, Jensen admitted, they were not successful in building
up local trade.2 ° During the Confederation period, Jensen wrote that the
only example of interstate friction from trade barriers resulted from New
York's taxation of goods coming from New Jersey and Connecticut, which
resulted in New Jersey's taxing of New York's lighthouse at Sandy Hook.
"This," Jensen sniffed, "is the teapot tempest which is so often cited as an
,2,
example of interstate trade barriers during the Confederation. He also
stated that most, if not all, states exempted from their duties and impost
laws goods made or grown in the United States."
Citing examples of reciprocity in a number of states, Jensen concluded
that "the picture by the end of 1787 [was] not the conventional one of
interstate trade barriers, but a novel one of reciprocity between state and
state." 3 Arguments to the contrary, he declared, mistake the contemporary
complaints of disaffected nationalizers for historical fact.
There is... little factual basis for the ancient tale repeated so faithfully by
writers who follow in one another's footsteps without examining the evi-
dence. The supporters of centralized power used the few discriminatory
laws as an argument for a new government [i.e., the Constitution], but they
popular narrative" made no significant errors of fact and generally got the tenor of the times
correct, qualified his praise with the remark that "as an authority the work is altogether with-
out scientific standing, because it is little more than a remarkably skillful adaptation of a very
few secondary authorities, showing almost no evidence of first-hand acquaintance with the
sources." ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1783-1789,
at 319-20 (1905).
19 JENSEN,sUpra note 13, at 337.
20 See id. at 338.
21 Id. at 339.
22 See id. at 339 n.24 ("Like the other states,... Connecticut exempted goods produced
or manufactured in the United States from import duties."); see also id. at 340:
The general rule was that all American goods were exempted from state
imposts. American ships paid no higher tonnage duties in the ports of
a state than did the shipowners of that state. Trade "barriers," contrary
to the tradition, were the exception, rather than the rule. In fact, there
were no trade barriers at all during the Confederation as compared with
interstate barriers which have grown up in the twentieth century.
Whatever Jensen may have meant by his last sentence, unlike during the Confederation
Period, effective weapons now exist with which to eliminate such barriers.
23 Id. at 342.
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ignored other laws which disproved their case, and so partisan argument in
time became "history."
24
In sum, Jensen argued that fears of commercial warfare among the states
were ghost stories told by Federalists to scare fence-sitters into supporting
the new Constitution and that, in fact, the Confederation period was one
of relative prosperity. To the extent that individual state legislation caused
problems, it was just because states were dealing inconsistently with foreign25
governments. The conventional wisdom that judged the Confederation a
failure, Jensen argued, was in large part winner's history.2
6
Jensen's revisionist thesis was embraced and pursued by William
Zornow, a historian who examined commercial statutes from 1775 to 1789
in five states and concluded in every case that states were not discriminat-
ing against their neighbors' commerce as charged, but rather had, by 1788,
moved toward a free trade regime.27 Like Jensen, Zornow concluded that
the charges of discrimination leveled by nationalists were at best inaccu-
rate, if not deliberate fabrications designed to ensure support for a more
centralized government.
In the pages that follow, I will argue that Jensen simply missed instanc-
es of discrimination among states during the Confederation period and that
Zornow often engaged in extremely strained readings of his evidence to
fit it neatly within the revisionist thesis. Discrimination in either tonnage
duties or in imposts was the policy of a number of important states in the
years before the Constitution of 1787, and this discrimination provoked
fear that such commercial rivalries would persist and fester if the Articles
of Confederation were not amended and power over interstate and foreign
commerce centralized. Moreover, despite the fact that states often exempt-
ed products that were produced, manufactured, or grown in the United
States, when states discriminated against ostensibly foreign goods imported
in one state by American merchants and exported for sale to another state,
it was the American merchant, not the foreign country, that felt the pinch.
Though not discrimination against products from other states, this practice
was no less discrimination against commerce from neighboring states.
24 Id. at 339.
25 Id. at 287-88, 292.
z6 Id. at 245-46,339-40.
27 See William Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies, 1775 to 1789, 38 GA. HIsT. Q. 1 (1954)
[herinafter Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies]; William F. Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff Poliies,
1775-1789, 90 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 194 (1954) [herinafter Zornow, Massachusetts
Taiff Policies]; William E Zornow, New York Tariff Policies, 1775-1789, 37 PROC. N.Y ST. HIST.
Ass'N 40 (1956) [hereinafter Zornow, New York TariffPolicies]; William F Zornow, Tariff Policies
in South Carolina, 1775-1789, 56 S.C. HIST. MAG. 31(1955) [hereinafter Zornow, South Carolina
Tariff Policies]; William F Zornow, The Tariff Policies of Virginia, 1775-1789, 62 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 306 (1954) [hereinafter Zornow, Virginia TariffPolicies].
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II. THE CONFEDERATION ECONOMY AND ITS REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW
A. Postwar Economic Expansion and Contraction
State economic regulation during the Revolution largely consisted of em-
bargoes on the export of goods necessary for the war effort and bounties
designed to encourage local production of those essentials that, because of
the war, were no longer imported.28 Following the end of the Revolution,
many states began to relax wartime restrictions and pass laws designed to
raise revenue and stimulate commercial activity.
29
The demand for goods was certainly present.30 The immediate after-
math of the war saw the U.S. economy expand. Demand for goods, especially
English goods,3' led to rising prices. To supply this demand, American mer-
chants took advantage of credit provided by English lenders to purchase
these goods. Curtis Nettels noted that the U.S. purchased nearly £6 mil-
lion worth of goods during 1784 and 1785, which resulted in price increases;
between 1784 and 1786, nearly £8 million worth of goods were purchased,
three-fourths to four-fifths of which were purchased on credit.33
Two things occurred as a result: the flood of imported goods threat-
ened the nascent domestic manufacturers that had grown up during the
war, and specie flowed out of the country to merchants' English creditors.34
28 See ALBERT ANTHONY GIESECKE, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1789, at
123 (1970 ed.) (I9IO) ("The outbreak of the Revolution severed the political and commercial
relations with England, which had existed for more than a century. For the next six or seven
years the vicissitudes of war gave little time or opportunity for trade, except in munitions of
war and the necessaries of life.") (footnote omitted); id. at 124, 125 (noting that "the main
emphasis [of wartime commercial regulation] was placed upon embargoes" and that "trade
was practically suspended" during the Revolution); JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD,
THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607-1789, at 363 (1985) (describing, as a consequence of
the War for Independence, "a diversion of resources into the indigenous production of goods
and services that had previously been purchased abroad"); CATHY D. MATSON & PETER S. ONUF,
A UNION OF INTERESTS: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 38
(I990) (describing the pattern of state economic regulation between 1778 and 1779 as consist-
ing of restrictions on imports and exports, limitation on profits, and embargoes).
29 CURTIS P. NETTELS, THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1775-1815, at 46
(1962) ("War-born shortages of goods quickly brought about a revival of the import trade.").
30 Id. at 45 (noting that by 1783 "states ... found themselves in urgent need of
manufactured goods"); see also MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 28, at 277 ("The most
significant aspect of the consumption of goods and services in the colonial economy was
probably the increase in demand over time.").
31 NE'IrELS, supra note 29, at 46 (discussing merchants' and consumers' preference for
English, as opposed to French goods).
32 Id. at 47 (noting the importance of the willingness of British lenders to extend credit
to American merchants).
33 Id. at 47-49.
34 Id. at 49 (discussing the outflow of hard currency resulting from the trade imbalance);
MATSON & ONUF, supra note 28, at 39 (noting that rumors of peace with England brought forth
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By 1784 this capital flight combined with a glut of goods, restrictions the
English placed on American merchants' access to overseas markets,35 and
depressed prices,36 had plunged the new nation into its first economic de-
pression. According to two economic historians, "something 'truly disas-
trous' happened to the American economy between 1775 and 179o."" The
performance of the economy during that period, they estimate, "fell by 46
percent."3 9 To offer a modern comparison, the gross national product dur-
ing the Great Depression fell by forty-eight percent.40
B. State Responses to Economic Crisis
During the Confederation era, state commercial regulation generally
took one or more of the following forms: (i) export embargoes imposed
on scarce goods; (2) impost duties levied on imports; (3) tonnage charges
imposed on cargo ships; and (4) export duties imposed on outgoing goods.
Embargoes were common during the war both to preserve scarce commod-
ities for home consumption as well as to keep valuable stores from falling
into British hands if the importing state was overrun. For the most part,
embargoes ceased with the end of the war with Britain.
Imposts and tonnage charges, imposed by nearly every state once the
war ended and commerce resumed, could serve several functions. First,
they could serve to raise revenue for the state. If the state had a busy port,
the revenue from such measures could spare the population direct taxes
on property or goods. Second, they could protect domestic industry. Many
states raised duties on "luxury" goods, commonly British goods, in retalia-
tion for the closing of various colonial ports to the ships of the newly inde-
pendent United States.
States also imposed tonnage duties, measured by the carrying capacity
of a ship's hold, on foreign shipping. With a few exceptions, export duties
were not widely used in the several states, though many states did impose
inspection fees designed to guarantee the quality and preserve the repu-
tation of products emerging from the state. The most frequent forms of
commercial regulation, and the most frequent sources of friction among the
an influx of goods and an outflow of currency).
35 See McCusKER & MENARD, supra note 28, at 370 ("[I1n the 178os both the agricultural
and commercial sector experienced some problems, stemming largely from the closing of
overseas markets for the goods produced.").
36 See NETTELS, supra note 29, at 62.
37 Nettels notes that as early as 1783 a glut of English goods in New York caused prices
to fall. See id. at 6o. Richard Morris pegs the year of the first depression as 1784. RICHARD B.
MoRas, TE FORGING OFTHE UNION, 1781-1789, at 130 (1987).
38 MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 28, at 373.
39 Id. at 374.
40 Id.
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several states in the Confederation period, were the impost duties imposed
on goods coming into the state and the tonnage duties imposed on ships
seeking to offload cargo at state ports.
In the words of one historian, "[pleace brought with it the necessity of
providing revenue to meet the current needs of government" and to pay off
41 42
war debts. ' Economic difficulties hampered these efforts. In response,
states began enacting protective tariffs seeking to raise revenue, curb im-
ports, stop outflows of hard currency, and protect domestic manufacturers.43
The tariffs usually targeted (i) foreign "luxuries," (2) goods that could be
supplied by state industries, (3) "useful" things not produced locally in
sufficient quantities, like coaches, and (4) foreign liquor.44 The result was a
confusing and conflicting skein of commercial regulations that lacked any
coordination-one historian wrote that "occasional instances of harmony"
were the result of "accident" not "design"4-and sowed the seeds for in-
terstate conflict.
46
During this period, according to one count, six states passed imposts,
nine states discriminated against British goods, seven states imposed duties
on British ship entrances and British commodities, and three states forbade
export of American goods in British ships. 47 Nationalists began to express
41 GIESECKE, sUpra note z8, at 126.
42 MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 28, at 372 (noting inadequacy of revenue measures
during the 178os).
43 MoRRis, supra note 37, at 148 ("To secure revenue, prevent dumping of foreign
goods, and protect emerging native industries, a majority of the thirteen states levied tariffs on
imports, a source of income they denied to Congress."); see also id. (listing "hardware, woolen
and cotton cloth, hats, and sailcloths" among industries "that enjoyed such protection");
NETTELS, supra note 29, at 69 ("Several of the states attempted to overcome the hardships
of the 178Os by enacting defensive or remedial laws" like protective tariffs; describing 1785
meetings of "manufacturers, artisans, and mechanics of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston"
at which they demanded duties designed to curb imports, protect industries and stop the
outflow of money) (footnote omitted); see also Willard Clark Fisher, American Trade Regulations
before1789,3 PAPERS OFTHE AM. HisT. Ass'N 223, 234 (1888) (listing imposts, tariffs, and tonnage
duties as included within the class of "those which bear upon imports" passed by states).
44 NETrELS, supra note 29, at 69-70.
45 Fisher, supra note 43, at 235; id. at 248 ("It is impossible briefly to summarize the whole
matter of colonial and state trade legislation, unless it be by the one word 'confusion."').
46 Id. ("Not only... were the regulations very numerous, but they were without unity
and harmony.").
47 Cathy Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, andthe New Nation, in I THE CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA 363,379 (Stanley L. Engerman
& Robert E. Gallman, eds., 1996) [hereinafter Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and
the New Nation]; see also NETTELS, supra note 29, at 72 ("The lawmakers of six states... put[]
special taxes on goods imported in British ships."); see also MATSON & ONuF, supra note 28, at
41, 45 (noting that after failed attempts to secure congressional power to regulate commerce
"[s]ix states enacted ... imposts" and that "[iun 1784 and 1785, nine states added steeper du-
ties on British goods entering their ports"); Fisher, supra note 43, at 245 (describing "[olne
particular form of discrimination" that depended upon "the nationality of the carrying hot-
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concern that "the states, acting on their own, were more likely to be drawn
into conflicts with one another than to improve their commercial situa-S ,,48,' .
tions. This began to occur as "[sitates with major port cities, especially
New York and Massachusetts, took advantage of their superior position in
international commerce and in regional markets to pass discriminatory du-
ties against neighboring states' traffic at their ports., 49 As Curtis Nettels
noted, "[i]nherent in state tariff laws was the danger that some states might
tax the exports of a neighbor, thereby limiting its market."50
Not surprisingly, though the aim of such state laws was "foreign goods,"
the line between foreign and domestic goods became blurred once these
5'goods were imported by American merchants and traveled among states.
Friction between states arose as these protective laws raised costs of im-
porting, shipping, and selling goods for American merchants. 52 Importers
responded by shifting goods from ports in states enacting such laws to
states that decided to make their ports duty-free and then by importing
those goods overland into taxing states.53 This, in turn, encouraged laws
tom"); GIESECKE, supra note 28, at I 8 (noting that "[d]iscrimination by higher duties on
goods imported in British vessels was most prominent in the New England states (except
Connecticut ... and New York.")).
For a rather dramatic description of the situation, see I GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF
THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i86 (New York, D.
Appleton and Company 1882):
[E]xcessive importations at low prices crushed domestic manufactures;
trade with the British West Indies was obstructed; neither rice, tobacco,
pitch, turpentine, nor ships could be remitted as heretofore.... The
Americans had chosen to be aliens to England; they could not complain
of being taxed like aliens, but they awoke to demand powers of
retaliation.
48 MATSON & ONUF, supra note 28, at 70.
49 Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, supra note 47, at 380.
50 NETrELS, supra note 29, at 71.
51 See GIESECKE, supra note 28, at 134:
The other tariff feature which necessarily developed out of the conditions
of the time was the discrimination or retaliation against commodities
imported from neighboring states.... [Wlith each state sovereign, there
was scarcely any redress, for few agreements existed which tended to
check discrimination.
52 See JENSEN, supra note 13, at 287 (noting that protective tariffs "show the widespread
interest in developing manufactures" while noting that the "passage of such legislation in-
volved sharp battles with the American importers"); id. at 292 (describing one such conflict in
Massachusetts in 1785).
53 See Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, supra note 47, at
38o-8I (noting that in response to New York's discriminatory tariff policies, states like New
Jersey and Delaware responded with free trade measures and "discouraged the flow of raw
materials to manufacturers in states which assessed heavy taxes on 'foreign'-that is, other
states' commodities"); NETTELS, supra note 29, at 73 (discussing how free trade policies of
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, and Georgia hurt their manufacturing
neighbors); see also MATSON & ONUF, supra note 28, at 72-73.
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aimed at goods imported from those states with duty-free ports, or those
goods originally imported in foreign bottoms, and the like. 54 For example,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island barred British ships
from loading U.S. products in their ports, which simply sent those ships to
ports in other states."5 In early 1785, New York imposed a five-percent tax
on commodities imported from other states for sale to New Yorkers in re-
sponse to efforts to avoid its imposts and tariffs on imported goods. 6 That
these laws, ostensibly directed at the British, often hit other Americans is
an important point to keep in mind when evaluating whether the exemp-
tion of out-of-state goods and manufacturers from state imposts and duties
meant that there was no discrimination against out-of-state commerce, as
the revisionists maintained.
States with fewer geographical advantages resented the bite that port
states took from commerce that had to pass through those ports before
arriving in the hinterlands. 57 This friction sometimes escalated, resulting
in imposts and tariffs specifically targeting goods coming from a particular
state. "By the mid- 1780s .... it was becoming clear to Americans concerned
about international and interstate developments that distinct state poli-
cies often pitted some groups of Americans against others."" s According to
many historians, this competition sometimes resulted in overt discrimina-
tion by one state against goods produced in or re-exported from a neighbor-
ing state. 9
54 For example, in 1785, New York imposed double duties on all goods imported in
British ships. It is said that this act "was the cause of considerable trouble and discrimination
by neighboring states" because it presumed that goods imported from Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New Jersey or Pennsylvania had been imported in British ships, unless it could
be proven otherwise. GIESECKE, supra note 28, at I z8-29, 129 n.24.
55 NETTELS, supra note 29, at 72.
56 Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, supra note 47, at 380; see
also NETTELS, supra note 29, at 72 ("Connecticut taxed foreign goods from Massachusetts,
and New York in 1787 put special duties on foreign goods imported by American vessels from
Connecticut and New Jersey.") (footnote omitted).
57 See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITIcs: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 341 (1979) (noting that because New Jersey lacked
a port, it contributed to New York's state impost).
58 Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, supra note 47, at 377.
59 See, e.g., GEISECKE, supra note 28, at 124-25, 126-27, 134-35, 139-40, 148; MATSON &
ONUF, supra note z8, at 72-75; MORRIS, supra note 37, at 148-49; NETrELS, supra note 29, at
69-73; Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, supra note 47, at 379-80.
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III. CONTEMPORARY COMMENT ON CONFEDERATION-ERA
STATE COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Although "[n]ationalists did not represent a majority of Americans between
1781 and 1784,... their numbers grew." "[T]roubled international com-
merce" and "the centrifugal, contentious economic interests rising among
the states" at the time "dampened ... postwar enthusiasm and reoriented
public and private views toward the Nationalists, ' 6' who warned that dis-
crimination against the commerce of neighboring states weakened the
economies of all states, and that the "enmity of 'sovereign' states made
Americans foreigners to one another," threatening both the economic self-
sufficiency of the new states as well as the Union as a whole.62 The inabil-
ity of the Continental Congress to harmonize the commercial policies of
the several states, and its failure to convince states to part with that much
of their sovereignty as would permit Congress to regulate commerce and
raise revenue of its own, convinced many fence-sitters that the problem lay
with the Articles of Confederation and encouraged moderate nationalists,
like James Madison, that the survival of the union necessitated substantial
changes in the constitutional regime.
63
The letters and writings of prominent advocates of constitutional re-. . 64
form, like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, constantly comment-
6o Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, supra note 47, at 372; see
also NETTrELS, supra note 29, at 6o ("The economic conditions existing in the Union in the
178o's proved to be extremely important. They formed an essential part of the background of
the making of the federal Constitution.").
61 Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, supra note 47, at 373.
62 MATSON & ONUF, supra note 28, at 51;
"Continentially-minded" nationalists became convinced that jealousies
between states with strong ports and states with weak ports, or between
northern and southern states, would negate hopes for self-sufficiency
both within and among the states. By erecting their own barriers to
British commerce, the American states perpetuated conflicts among
themselves....
Id. at 74.
63 See id. at 67 ("Nationalists were convinced that congressional impasse over commercial
policy was a function of the fundamental flaws in the organization of the union under the
Articles of Confederation.").
64 Even before the Revolution ended, worries were expressed about the lack of
uniformity in the laws of the States. In 178o, Alexander Hamilton wrote to his friend James
Duane that:
[tlhe fundamental defect [in the Confederation] is a want of power in
Congress....The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty in each state,
over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress,
and make our union feeble and precarious. There are instances without
number, where acts necessary for the general good, and which rise out
of the powers given to Congress must interfere with the internal police
of the states, and there are as many instances in which particular states
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ed upon the inability of the Confederation government to stop commer-
cial predation among the states. 6s Expressions of frustration at the states'
unwillingness to grant sufficient power to the Confederation Congress to
ensure its financial independence, and at the states' commercial policies
regarding both foreign and interstate commerce, abound in the writings
of the future collaborators. Madison and others eventually concluded that
only a general grant of power to Congress, coupled with explicit restric-
tions on the states, would secure the financial and commercial future of
the United States. These two men were neither mindless nationalizers, nor
were they "angry politicians and soldiers" who "were seldom easy when in
office and who prophesied doom when their opponents won elections," as
Merrill Jensen characterized critics of the Confederation.6
A. Failed Efforts to Reform the Articles of Confederation
In 1781 Congress recommended to the states that it be given the power to
impose a five-percent impost on imports. All states but Rhode Island ap-
67 . 68proved ; thereafter, Virginia rescinded its initial ratification of the impost,
effectively dooming it, as other states followed Virginia's lead.6 Undaunted
by the failure of the impost of 1781, Congress proposed that it be given the
power, for a period of twenty-five years, to levy a duty on imported goods
"with the express understanding that the income should be used only for
the discharge of principal and interest of the debt., 70 But the states resisted
by arrangements of internal police can effectually though indirectly
counteract the arrangements of Congress....
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 178o), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 401-02 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., I96I-68). Congress, Hamilton
argued, must have "powers competent to the public exigencies," regardless of any effects on
state sovereignty. Id. at 407.
65 See infra Part III.B.
66 JENSEN, supra note 13, at 85.
67 See, e.g., Act of May, 1782, ACTS AND LAWS MADE AND PASSED BY THE GOVERNOR AND
COMPANY OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 599 (1782) (authorizing Congress to impose five-
percent advalorem impost on imports "from any Port, Island or Plantation not within any of
the United States") [hereinafter CONNECTICUT ACTS]; Act of June 2, 178 1, Ch. XXIII, ACTS
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 75 (1781) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY
ACTS].
68 See, e.g., Act of May, 1781, Ch. II, ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 4 (781) (suspended in November, 1781) [hereinafter VIRGINIA
ACTS], repealedby Act of May, 1782, Ch. XLII, VIRGINIA ACTS, supra, at 4.
69 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 26, 1782, Ch. VIII, ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 14 (1782) (impost approval) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS],
repealed by Act of March 16, 1783, SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS, supra, at 57 (citing as the reason for
repeal the refusal of Rhode Island and the repeal of Virginia, both of which made the previous
act "repugnant to the commercial interest of this State").
70 McLAUGHLIN, supra note 18, at 79 (footnotes omitted); see also MAX FARRAND, "IE
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this measure, too; many were unwilling to act without assurances that the
others would not undercut them.' A 1784 proposal asked that Congress
be given the power to "meet the restrictions of England [on American im-
ports] with similar restrictions," including
the right for fifteen years to pass a navigation act, and thus prohibit the im-
portation or exportation of any goods in ships belonging to or navigated by
subjects of any power with whom the United States should not have a treaty
of commerce. Authority was also asked to prohibit... the subjects of any for-
eign state, unless authorized by treaty, from bringing into the United States
merchandise which was not the product or manufacture of the dominions
72
of their sovereign.
Historian Andrew McLaughlin reported that "the request of Congress
for power to pass a navigation act met with a cold reception in the states,"
which "acted ... as if some foreign power rather than their own representa-
tives were asking for authority. ' 73 Suspicion of abetting the growth of con-
gressional power and thereby reducing their own power, as well as states'
"You first, Alphonse" aversion to unilateral action, put them in a bind. In
McLaughlin's words:
Refusing to grant power to Congress, the states could not themselves act in
unison. Some of them had passed their own acts in regulation of commerce,
but such independent measures were ineffectual.... In fact, their laws were
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1913) (describing efforts of Congress
to wrest commercial power from the states).
71 See, e.g., Act of June s I, 1783, Ch. XXVII, NEW JERSEY ACTS 54 (1783) (repealing 1781
Act, but allowing Congress to lay impost on imported rum, liquor, wine, tea, pepper, sugar,
coffee, cocoa, and other goods for twenty-five years; until such time as the necessary number
of states approve, "all the Ports in this State be... free and open for the Importation and
Exportation of any Goods... clear of all Duties, Customs or Impositions.").
In spite of all efforts and though the need was sore, the recommendations
were not followed by the states. Each watched the other warily, fearing
that its neighbor might win some commercial advantage. Three years
after the measure was laid before the states for adoption, seven states-
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina-had granted the impost in such
a manner and under such restrictions that if the other states had made
similar grants the plan of the impost might immediately have gone into
operation. But Pennsylvania and Delaware had consented to the measure
with the proviso that it should not go into effect until all of the states
passed laws in conformity with the whole revenue system proposed.
Only two of the states-Delaware and North Carolina-acceded to the
system in all its parts; and four-Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, and
Georgia-did not decide in favor of any part of the system.
McLAUGHLIN, supra note 18, at 79-80.
72 McLAUGHLIN, supra note s8, at 84 (footnote omitted).
73 Id. at 85 (footnotes omitted).
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confusing and conflicting. There seemed at times to be little desire to reach
a common basis for the regulation of commerce or the levying of imposts.
Too often legislation was shaped rather by jealousy and the hope to win
trade away from a neighboring state than by principles of wise policy or
foresight.74
In a final, futile attempt to bring some order to the commercial
scene, Congress requested the power to levy imposts the year before the
Annapolis Convention. Though some states acceded to its request," more
than enough states attached leaden conditions, designed to sink the plan,S 76
to ensure its failure. McLaughlin concluded that "[elxperience, it is plain,
had before 1786 taught the necessity of bestowing on some central author-
ity the power to regulate commerce and the power to obtain revenue with-
out merely begging for it."77
B. State Commercial Policy and the Growing Sentiment for Systemic Reform
Writing to James Madison in 1782, Edmund Randolph expressed frus-
tration at the inability of Congress to pass generally applicable laws for-
bidding trade with areas of the country occupied by the British, and the
78lack of comparable state laws on the subject. Frustration grew with the
74 Id. at 86 (footnotes omitted). Professor Farrand provided a similar characterization:
Pending a grant of power to congress over matters of commerce, the
states acted individually. A uniform policy was necessary, and while a
pretense was made of acting in unison to achieve a much desired end, it
is evident that selfish motives frequently dictated what was done. Any
state which enjoyed superior conditions to a neighboring state was only
too apt to take advantage of that fact... . Interference with the arteries
of commerce was cutting off the very life-blood of the nation, and
something had to be done. The articles of confederation provided no
remedy....
FARRAND, supra note 7o, at 7.
75 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 2, 1784, NEW HAMPSHIRE ACTS, at 307; Act of June 23, 1785, NEw
HAMPSHIRE ACTS, at 361 (vesting Congress with authority "to make and enter into such general
ordinances and treaties, for the due regulation of the Trade and Commerce of the United
States, as they may judge best calculated to promote the weal and prosperity thereof" with all
revenue derived to be "appropriated to the sole use of discharging the public debt"); Act of
Dec. z8, 1786, NEW HAMPSHIRE ACTS, at 425 (same; combining Acts of 1784 and 1785); Act of
March 21, 1784, SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS, at 19 (authorizing the imposition of certain duties on
rum, liquor, wines, tea, pepper, sugar, cocoa, and coffee).
76 See, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1784, Ch. LXXXV, NEW JERSEY ACTS, at 176-77 (authorizing
imposition of duties specified in previous Act "as soon as eleven States of the Union shall
adopt or accede to the Measure"); Act of March 21, 1784, SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS, at 2 1, repealed
by Act of March 11, 1786, SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS, at 16 (expanding the grant of power to
include West Indies and "all other external or foreign trade of the said States" for fifteen years
upon the consent of nine of the thirteen states).
77 McLAUGHLIN, SUpra note 18, at 173.
78 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Aug. 16, 1782), in 5 THE PAPERS or
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news that Rhode Island had refused its assent to the five-percent impost
requested by Congress. Madison wrote to Randolph of Rhode Island's "ob-
stinacy," which was "a blow to our credit abroad as well as our future credit
at home. ' 9 Madison commented that Rhode Island's intransigence was
due in part to the "limited manner in which other states have acceded to
the impost from which she infers a latent repugnance to the measure."
8
o
Edmund Pendleton proposed repassing the impost and levying a duty on
all goods imported into Rhode Island, then exported to other states, to pre-
8,
vent a windfall to her ports.
The states' unwillingness to cede control over the levying of imposts
and duties was in part due to the fact that such measures were a way to
raise revenue without directly taxing their citizens. In notes Madison made
while in Congress in 1783, he assayed the states' interest in what he called
"a general revenue" for Congress. According to his notes, much state sup-
port hinged on the expectation that the general revenue would insulate• . . 83
states from the predations of their neighbors.• . 84 85 86
In Madison's notes, Connecticut, NewYork, New Jersey, and North
Carolina 87 were all favorably disposed to a congressional power to collect a
general revenue on commerce as a way to guard against separate taxation
JAMES MADISON 59 (William T Hutchinson et al. eds., 1967) [hereinafter MAoISON PAPERS].
79 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Nov. 26, 1782), in MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 331 (footnote omitted).
8o Id.
8i Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 383. Pendleton wrote of his idea that
I se[e] no objection to this method, unless it be supposed that this duty
would be considered such a [cilog upon trade as to give Rhode Island an
unreasonable advantage in commerce by throwing the imports into that
State-an objection w[hi]ch ... does not appear of much consequence,
when applied to a single [state], especially if provision be made for
Subjecting to the Duty all goods imported there, & afterwards brought
into another State....
Id.
82 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at 290.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 291 ("Connecticut is interested in a general revenue as tending to protect
her from separate taxation by N. York & Rhode Island....").
85 See id. ("N. York is exceedingly attached to a general revenue as tending to support
the confederacy and prevent future contests among the States.").
86 See id. ("N. Jersey is interested as a smaller State in a general revenue as tendg [sic]
to support the confederacy, and to prevent future contests and to guard her commerce agst.
the separate taxation of Pennsylvania & N.Y.").
87 See id. at 292 (supporting general revenue to protect against taxation by South
Carolina and Virginia).
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88 89 90
by neighboring states. Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South
Carolina,9' which profited from taxing the commerce of neighboring states,
opposed it. Despite the recognition that the common interest of the states
lie in fostering free trade, few of them were willing to take steps unilat-
erally; the momentum continued away from the five-percent impost into
1783, with more rescissions threatened.9'
Thus, as early as 1783, Madison worried over the commercial policies
of the states. He wrote Jefferson that the merchants of Philadelphia and
Baltimore were so heavily taxing the imports and exports of Virginia that it
amounted to "a tribute which if paid into the treasury of [Virginia] would
yield a surplus above all its wants." 93 Madison continued to brood over the
national situation after he left the Confederation Congress and assumed
a seat in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1784.94 During this period,
Madison became convinced that the Articles of Confederation needed
revision, and concluded (albeit with reservations) that a national conven-
tion was the correct forum for the presentation and debate of such amend-
ments. Commercial matters were foremost in his mind, and among com-
mercial matters, the situation among the states themselves figured promi-
nently in his correspondence and his plans to remedy the impotence of the
Confederation Congress.
In a letter to Madison on December 14, 1784, James Monroe reported
that Connecticut had "laid a duty of 5 pr. centm. upon all goods imported
from a neighb[o]ring State," which was calculated "to affect[] R[hode]
Island very sensibly."9 5 A letter from Monroe in July 1785 described efforts
to amend the Articles of Confederation in Congress. One proposal would
have "invest[ed] Congress with power to regulate trade externally & in-
88 See id. at 291 ("Rhode Island as a weak State is interested in a general revenue as
tending to support the confederacy and prevent future contentions, but against it as tending
to deprive Her of the advantage afforded by her situation of taxing the commerce of the
contiguous States....").
89 See id. ("As far as a general impost on trade would restrain [Pennsylvania] from taxing
the trade of N. Jersey it would be against her interest.").
9o See id. (commenting on Virginia's desire to tax the commerce of North Carolina).
9i Seeid. at 292 (commenting on South Carolina's similar desire to tax the commerce of
North Carolina).
92 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. I, 1783), in 6
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at 429-30 (reporting "alarming" news of repeal of five-percent
impost by lower house of Massachusetts and South Carolina). But see id. at 431 n.3 (explaining
that neither state ended up rescinding approval at that time).
93 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1783), in 7 MADIsoN
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 401; see also id. at 403 n. 1 o.
94 See 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at xix-xxi.
95 Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Dec. 14, 1784), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 78, at 184.
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t ,,96 ,r
ternally. The arguments in favor of such a power were based largely on
the benefits of uniformity. If the states continued to pursue separate com-
mercial policies with regard to both foreign nations and their neighboring
states, "they will become instrumental in their hands to impede & defeat
those of each other."97 By acting "against each other," Monroe wrote, the
states "establish'd deep-rooted jealousies & enmities between them" and
"such a course tended to throw them apart & weaken the present rights of
the confederacy."9
Madison set forth his views in a lengthy response to Monroe. While
confessing his own preference for free trade, Madison allowed that the
power to regulate commerce, "[ilf it be necessary... at all" must surely
be lodged in Congress "where trade can be regulated with effect."99 This
power "can never be so regulated by the States acting in their separate
capacities," he continued, dryly noting that "experience has confirmed
what reason foresaw.' Madison ruefully noted in a letter to Jefferson that
"Congress have kept the Vessel from sinking, but it has been by standing
constantly at the pump, not by stopping the leaks which have endangered
her."'0 ' One of the "leaks" was the lack in Congress of an adequate power
over trade. '°2 Madison noted that even the unilateral actions of some states,
like Pennsylvania's imposition of a levy on imports from Great Britain,
"could scarcely be enforced against the smuggler, if N. Jersey, Delaware &
Maryland were to co-operate with her."' 03
Madison reluctantly advocated the calling of the Annapolis Convention
as a way to remedy the commercial defects of the Articles. '°4 His support
for it came only after his "unwavering determination to strike the problem
at its root"'O' failed to stop the leaks in the Articles. His determination is
evident in a set of resolutions Madison drafted in November 1785. Though
96 Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (July 26, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 78, at 329.
97 Id. at 330.
98 Id.
99 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 7, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 78, at 333.
ioo Id.
1o Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 3, 1785), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 373.
102 Id. at 374.
103 Id. at 375.
104 See Debates and Resolutions Related to the Regulation of Commerce by Congress,
Including a Call for a Convention at Annapolis, November 1785-January 1786, in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 406 (editorial note) ("[Tlhe documents and letters emanating from
the October 1785 session of the Virginia General Assembly show that Madison was consistently
lukewarm to the convention approach as a remedy for the ills of national government.").
Io5 Id. at 407.
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entitled "Draft of Resolutions on Foreign Trade," '6 it contained references
to difficulties arising from competition over interstate commerce as well.
"[Tihe unrestrained exercise of the powers possessed by each State over
its own commerce," the second resolve read, "may be productive of discord
among the parties to the Union; and ... Congs. ought to be vested with au-
thority to regulate the same in certain cases."' 7 The fourth resolve stated
that
no State ought to be at liberty to impose duties on any goods ware or merchandizes
imported by land or water from any other State, but each State ought to be free
to prohibit altogether the importation from any other State, of any particu-
lar species or description of goods wares or merchandizes, which are at the
same time prohibited to be imported from all other places whatsoever.""
This section was preserved in the final resolution passed by the Virginia
House of Delegates on November 14, 1785.' °9 The resolution was a firm
statment of the sentiment expressed by George Washington in a reply to
Madison's resolutions. Washington wrote that
[tihe proposition in my opinion is so self evident that I confess I am at a loss
to discover wherein lyes [sic] the weight of the objection to the measure. We
are either a United people, or we are not. If the former, let us, in all matters
of general concern act as a nation, which have national objects to promote,
and a national character to support. If we are not, let us no longer act a farce
by pretending to it.' "
In notes composed by Madison in "a hasty preparation for the House
debates on 30 Nov. and i Dec.""' on the resolutions, he wrote that regula-
tions were "necessary to prevent animosity... & smuggling," listing out to
the side the names of Massachusetts and Connecticut; New York and New
Jersey; and Pennsylvania." 2
During the same legislative session, Madison co-sponsored a resolu-
tion calling for a federal convention for the purpose of proposing amend-
io6 Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
107 Id.
Io8 Id. at 409-10. (emphasis added). The latter clause "must have been written with
the slave trade in mind;" Virginia had prohibited the importation of slaves since i778. Id. at
41o n.2.
io9 See Resolution Calling for the Regulation of Commerce by Congress (Nov. 14, 1785),
reprintedin 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at 413-14. Note that the title of the resolution
was changed, and now reflected a general concern with "Commerce," rather than a specific
concern with "Foreign Trade."
I io Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Nov. 30, 1785), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 429.
I I I See Notes for Debate on Commercial Regulation by Congress (Nov. 30-Dec. i,
1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at 432 n.
1I2 Id. at431.
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ments to the articles dealing with the regulation of commerce. In a let-
ter to Jefferson, who was in Paris, Madison wrote that "[tihe necessity of
harmony in the comercial [sic] regulations of the states has been rendered
every day more apparent," and he further noted that efforts aimed at the
trade of Great Britain "instead of succeeding have in every instance re-
coiled more or less on the states which ventured on the trial.""' 3 When
Madison described the resolutions passed by the House of Delegates, in-
terstate commercial discrimination was prominently mentioned as a source
of friction among states, one to be remedied by granting a power of com-
merce coupled with concomitant restrictions on the States:
[The resolutions'] object was to give Congs. such direct power only as would
not alarm, but to limit that of the States in such manner as wd. indirectly re-
quire a conformity to the plans of Congs. The renunciation of the right of laying
duties on imports from other States, would amount to a prohibition of duties on im-
portsfrom foreign Countries, unless similar duties existed in other States. This idea
was favored by the discord produced between several States by rival and adverse
regulations. The evil had proceeded so far between Connecticut & Massts.
that the former laid heavier duties on imports from the latter than from G.
B. of which the latter sent a letter of complaint to the Executive here and I
suppose to the other Executives. Without some such self-denying compact it will,
I conceive be impossible to preserve harmony among the contiguous States.'"
On the same day, Madison wrote to Monroe complaining of the failure
of the Virginia legislature to revise the State's commercial statutes, with the
result that the old statute, which Madison described as "[d]efective .. •par-
ticularly in putting Citizens of other States on the footing offoreigners" was left
in place."' In March 1786, Madison again complained to Jefferson that the
states were, through diverse commercial policies, frustrating sister states
that had retaliated against Great Britain for the closing of its ports in the
West Indies to American ships. In August of the same year, Madison
complained of paper money measures in the States, claiming that "it is pro-
113 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 22, 1786), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 476.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Jan. 22, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 78, at 483 (emphasis added).
1 16 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 502 ("The States are every day giving proofs that separate regulations
are more likely to set them by the ears, than to attain the common object. When Massts. set
on foot a retaliation of the policy of G[reat] B[ritain] Connecticut declared her ports free.
N. Jersey served N. York in the same way. And Delaware I am told has lately followed the
example in opposition to the commercial plans of Penna. A miscarriage of this attempt to
unite the States in some effectual plan [i.e., the Annapolis Convention] will have another
effect of a serious nature. It will dissipate every prospect of drawing a steady revenue from
our imposts... ").
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ducing the same warfare & retaliation among the States as were produced
by the State regulations of commerce."'
C. To the Philadelphia Convention
In September 1786, Madison attended the abortive convention at Annapolis,
Maryland. Initially lukewarm to the idea of a convention, Madison's affin-
ity for a general convention of the states as a way to achieve a solution to
the seemingly intractable commercial controversies steadily increased.'
There was some opinion that Madison was pursuing too narrow an agenda
in Annapolis. Rufus King, congressman from New England, wrote the busi-
ness partner of an Annapolis delegate that to be effective Congress needed
much more than plenary power over commerce. Presciently, King wrote
that, in any event, without an effective judicial remedy, any powers granted
could not be effectively enforced. " 9
Though the convention was stillborn, evidence suggests that Madison
and others had intended the convention to take up not only the problem
of diverse state actions stymieing effective regulation of foreign com-
merce, but also the use of regulations to oppress each other. In a letter
from Pennsylvanian Tench Coxe to the Virginia Commissioners, Coxe re-
ported that while the commercial laws of Pennsylvania "exempt intirely
[sic] from impost all Goods Wares or Merchandise of the growth, product
or Manufacture of the United States," the laws of other (unspecified) states
imposed tonnage duties on out-of-state ships and their owners "greater than
[those] imposed on Vessels belonging to the Citizens of the State enacting1 20
the law" and equivalent to those imposed on foreign ships. Coxe also
noted that discrimination existed between imported products from other
states and those grown or manufactured in-state, and that these duties were• 121
sometimes as high as those imposed on foreign goods of the same kind.
Such laws, Coxe wrote, were "evidently opposed to the great principles
and Spirit of the Union."' 22
117 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 9 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 95.
i18 See The Annapolis Convention, September, 1786, in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note
78, at 115-16 (editorial note).
I 19 See id. at 118 ("[Madison] does not discover or propose any other plan than that of
investing congress with full powers for the regulation of commerce foreign and domestic ....
But this power will run deep into the authorities of the individual states, and can never be well
exercised without a federal Judicial.") (quoting Letter from Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson
(Sept. 3, 1786), in 8 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 460 (Edmund C.
Burnett ed., 1921-36)).
120 See Letter from Tench Coxe to the Virginia Commissioners at Annapolis (Sept. 13,
1786), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at 125.
I21 Id.
122 Id.
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After the failure of the Annapolis Convention, and prior to the 1787
convocation in Philadelphia that eventually produced the Constitution,
Madison expanded work begun in 1786 in which he systematically ana-
lyzed ancient and modern constitutions, cataloguing their virtues and
vices.'23 Madison then turned his attention to the defects of the articles;
the result was his Vices of the Political System of the United States,'2 4 in which
Madison listed twelve "vices," their causes, and possible remedies. As
the editors of his papers point out "the dominant theme of Vices of the
Political System ... was... the deficiencies and derelictions of the state gov-
ernments." 25 Prominent among these was "[t]he practice of many States in
restricting the commercial intercourse with other States, and putting their
productions and manufactures on the same footing with those of foreign
nations." 126
IV. STATE COMMERCIAL DISCRIMINATION, 1781-1787
After reviewing the available commercial legislation for all thirteen states
from 1781 to 1787, ' 7 it seems that several states engaged in discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce, of one sort or another, during the
Confederation era. While much of this discrimination occurred in northern
states such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, both Virginia
and South Carolina engaged in some form of commercial discrimination
as well.
As noted above, the revisionist view of the Confederation era holds that
commercial discrimination among states, to the extent that it occurred at
all, was very limited. Merrill Jensen wrote that there was only one dispute,
123 See James Madison, Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies (April-June,
1786), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at 3-24.
124 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 78, at 345-58-
125 Id. at 346.
126 Id. at 350. Interestingly, Madison wrote that this practice-while "certainly adverse
to the spirit of the Union, and tends to beget retaliating regulations" that themselves are
"expensive & vexatious" in and of themselves, not to mention "destructive of the general
harmony"-is "not contrary to the federal articles." Id. This is a puzzling comment,
considering that Article IV of the Articles of Confederation placed all citizens of the United
States on equal footing and obliged states not to treat each state's citizens differently in the
imposition of duties. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1781); see also infra notes 229-49
and accompanying text.
127 I reviewed two sets of microfiche. One at the Yale Law School; the other at Southern
Illinois University School of Law. I settled on 1781 as a starting point, because the Articles
had become effective then and the War for Independence was winding down, allowing
something approaching normal trade to resume. The year 1787 was chosen as a terminating
point, because by 1788, state commercial legislative efforts would have been colored by the
impending ratification of the Constitution in most places.
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between New Jersey and New York, that had its roots in the commercial
policies of those states. This section will show that this is simply not true. In
fact, seven states engaged in some form of discrimination against the com-
merce of neighboring states. In some cases, the discrimination spawned
retaliatory action from other states. Virginia provides one of the clearest
examples of discrimination against interstate commerce and the best ex-
ample that Jensen's conclusions were in error.
A. Virginia
In 1781, the General Assembly passed An Act for ascertaining certain Taxes
and Duties, and for establishing a permanent Revenue.128 Section VI of that act
imposed-in addition to specified duties on liquor, wine, flour, sugar, and
coffee imported "from any port or place whatsoever"-a one-percent ad va-
lorem duty "for all other goods or merchandise which shall be imported or
brought into this commonwealth... from any port or place whatsoever." 2 9
While the act seems clear that all goods imported were subject to du-
ties, confusion about its scope occasioned the passage, in 1782, of a further
act intended to dispel the supposition that "the ... words 'foreign parts'
were intended to exclude vessels and goods coming from any state in this
union from paying the tonnage and other duties."' 30 To "remov[e] ... such
doubts and misconstruction," the act stated emphatically "[tihat all vessels
coming within this State from any of the United States, or from any port
or place whatsoever, vessels of war excepted, shall be liable to pay the ton-
nage and other duties" specified in the act.' 3' The legislature repassed the
inclusive duty as part of a consolidation of various revenue acts that took
place in 1782,132 and in 1784 raised the one-percent duty on imported goods
to two-and-a-half percent.
33
Available evidence suggests that the duties remained in place even af-
ter the Constitution was submitted to the states for ratification. In 1787,
prior to Virginia's ratification of the Constitution, a group of merchants pe-
titioned the Virginia House of Delegates requesting a repeal of duties and
128 Act of Nov., 1781, Ch. XL, at 27. Unless otherwise noted, all citations for Virginia
were taken from microfilmed copies of Acts Passed at a General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Virginia at the Yale Law School and at Southern Illinois University School of Law. The session
laws run chronologically. The page numbers given are those in the session laws for that year.
129 Id. at § VI.
13o Act of May, 1783, Ch. LXXIX, § XIV, at 24, 25.
131 Id. at 25.
132 See Act of Oct., 1782, Ch. CIII, § VIII, at 6, 9.
133 Act of May, 1784, Ch. XIII, § 2, at 8; see also Act of Oct., 1786, Ch. XXIX, at 21
(imposing duties on liquor, cheese, tea, hemp, and cordage; tonnage duties on ships for
maintenance of lighthouse). But see Act of Oct., 1786, Ch. XXX, at 21 (exempting "beer, ale,
porter, or other malt liquors.., being the manufacture of the United States").
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imposts on goods imported from other states.'3 4 "Trade and mutual inter-
course," they wrote, "ought to be free. Restrictions are inconsistent with
the spirit of the Union .... 35 The merchants therefore requested that "all
Laws imposing Duties on Goods or Merchandise from any of our Sister
States... be repealed," , 6 and apparently they were.'37
To the utter embarrassment of James Madison and other moderate na-
tionalists, Virginia was itself a notable violator of the letter and the spirit
of the Articles of Confederation. Virginia was quite clear about its trade
policies; it even passed a statute to make clear its intention to tax all com-
merce coming into Virginia from elsewhere. Yet nowhere did Jensen dis-
cuss Virginia's discriminatory policies. Perhaps Virginia's illiberal trade poli-
cies acutely sensitized Madison to the problem of commerce, rendering it
central to his thoughts of reforming the Articles.
B. New York
New York took great advantage of its port facilities. According to one histo-
rian of the period, New York's tariff "relieved the land and property of the
state from heavy taxation," though it also "complicated New York's rela-
tions with her neighbors," "8 who resented the heavy bite taken out of com-
merce imported into New York. 39 According to one calculation, New York's
134 Memorial of Winchester [Virginia] Merchants and Traders to the Virginia House of Delegates
(prior to Nov. 6, 1787), in VIII THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION (Merill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) (Va. 17 Microfiche Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
Winchester Memorial].
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See Act of Jan. 1, 1788, Ch. I, § V (exempting from duty "all goods, wares and
merchandise ... of the growth, production or manufacture of any of the United States of
America" except for distilled spirits made from imported materials), reprinted in 12 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619 (William Waller Henning ed., 1823).
Reprinted collections of old state statutes contain additional evidence that other
enactments were repealed following the ratification of the Constitution. See Act of Feb. 1o,
1787, reprinted in I THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 351 n.* (John D. Cushing ed.,
198i) (noting that certain portions of an act laying duties on certain imported goods and
tonnage duties was "rendered obsolete by the operation of the general government"); Act
of Feb. 1, 1788, reprinted in id. at 380 (noting that "So much of this act as relates to trade and
duties on imports, now under the regulation of Congress." (emphasis in original)); Act of Feb. I,
1789, reprinted in id. at 384 (omitting rates of duties for importation of "goods, wares, liquors,
merchandize and negroes" and rates of "impost on the tonnage of all vessels" arriving in the
state, because "the same being under the regulation of congress").
138 E. WILDER SPALDING, NEW YORK IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD, 1783-I789, at 153 (1932).
139 Id. at 156 (noting that in 1785 New York not only "took her toll from imports
passing through to her neighboring states, but taxed foreign articles which reached her after
importation in foreign ships through neighboring ports. The state's income from the tariff was
larger than that of most other states because of the exactions upon the trade of neighboring
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tariff accounted for one-third of its total revenue during the Confederation
era; landowners who were spared heavy tax burdens constituted a powerful
interest group opposed to its reform.'
40
For the most part, New York impost laws exempted goods grown orS141
produced in other states. But its legislature, at one point, embargoed ex-
ports of wheat, flour, and meal to depress prices for its consumers. This of
course angered her neighbors, who saw prices rise as a result.' 42 When the
Council of Censors vetoed the embargo "on the ground that it would prob-
ably embroil the state with its neighbors who would retaliate with similar
embargoes, and so ruin its trade" the Assembly passed the bill over the
Council's veto with only two dissenting votes. 
43
In addition, beginning in 1785, New York passed an act stating that after
July I, 1786, all foreign goods imported into New York from Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania "shall be subject to the like
duties as are by this act imposed on all goods wares and merchandize im-
ported into this State ... in any British vessel, or any ship or vessel owned
by any British subject or subjects" unless it could be proven that the im-
ported goods were not imported into the State of origin in British ships.
44
It was this act that resulted in New Jersey taking steps to tax the lighthouse
owned by New York, and located on Sandy Hook.' 4 In this case, as in oth-
ers, New York was retaliating against neighboring states that adopted free-
- 146
trade policies in light of New York's policy of heavy taxation. For its part,
states passing through the ports of New York.") (footnote omitted); id. at 156 (commenting
that New York's policy meant that Connecticut "was tributary to New York").
140 See id. at 153-54 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth's claim that opposition to reform of
the tariff stemmed from legislatures being "unwilling[] to sacrifice the state impost which
levied tribute on the neighboring states as well as on the merchants of New York City while it
relieved the landholder") (footnote omitted).
141 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 25, 1783, Ch. XVIII, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 533-34
(1783) (adding the proviso that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect the
sale of any goods, wares or merchandizes of the growth produce or manufacture of this or
any other of the United States of America") (unless otherwise noted, all laws cited here can
be found in the microfilmed session laws, which run chronologically); Act of March 22, 1784,
Ch. X, at 599 (excepting United States goods); Act of Nov. 18, 1784, Ch. VII (exempting most
other "goods wares and merchandizes of the growth, product or manufacture of the United
States of America, or any of them"); Act of April 1I, 1787, Ch. LXXXI, at 509 (exempting the
same products).
142 MATSON & ONUF, supra note 28, at 73; SPALDING, supra note 138, at 156.
143 SPALDING, supra note 138, at 156.
I44 Act of March 15, 1785, Ch. XXXIV, at 65; see also MATSON & ONUF, supra note 28, at
73.
145 SPALDING, supra note 138, at 157 ("In 1787 New York increased its duties and placed
entrance and clearance fees upon coasting vessels. New Jersey retaliated by levying a tax of
£30 a month on the Sandy Hook Light, kept by New York in Jersey territory.").
146 Id. (noting that in 1784 Connecticut reimposed duties in response to New York's
refusal to adopt the free-trade policies Connecticut had).
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following the imposition of the 1786 tariff, Connecticut in 1787 "resolved
to export nothing to New York and to furnish the latter's ships with no land-
ing for the period of a year."
'1
4 1
C. Connecticut
In 1784, Connecticut passed an act establishing the cities and ports of New
Haven and New London as free ports which entitled, for a period of seven
years, "Foreigners and Citizens of any of the United States" who settled
in either city "to pay no other or greater Duties or Taxes than the Citizes
[sic] of this State residing in said Cities" were required to pay.148 The next
session, however, the legislature passed a law imposing duties on wines,
brandy, rum, snuff, teas, coffee, chocolate, sugar, malt liquors, and paper
"imported or brought into this State, by Land or Water, from any of the
United States of America"-only malt liquor manufactured in the United
States was exempt.' 49 In the following section, though, the act exempted
from a five-percent ad valorem duty "upon all other Goods, Wares and
Merchandize, not before enumerated in this Act, that are ... the Growth,
Produce, or Manufacture of the United States.""0
It appears that the articles first enumerated were of foreign origin, but
were finding their way into Connecticut through other states, perhaps ones
with liberal trade policies towards foreign countries. This seems supported
by the third paragraph, which exempts from the five-percent impost the
property of Connecticut citizens importing foreign goods into the United States
"from any foreign Port or Place, with a Design and Intent to be imported
into this State."' 5 ' In October of 1784, however, the Connecticut legislature
passed a further Impost Law which, while exempting homegrown textiles
from a two-percent impost, imposed a three-pence duty "on each Pound
of Sugar, other than brown Sugar, whether the Produce or Manufacture of the
United States or not."' 5 2 In 1787, the state imposed a tonnage fee on coasting
vessels "bound either to the State of New York or Rhode-Island."'
5 3
D. Massachusetts
Massachusetts' first tariff, levied in 1782, "provided for a lengthy list of
enumerated duties" including "[many] ... commodities [that] were pro-
147 Id.
148 Act of May, 1784, CONNECTICUT ACTS, at 269.
149 Act of Jan. 1784, CONNECTICUT ACTS, at 27 1.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Act of Oct. 1784, CONNECTICUT ACTS, at 309 (emphasis added).
153 Act of Oct. 1787, CONNECTICUT ACTS, at 356.
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duced in neighboring states and were unquestionably subject to the pre-
vailing duties," the only exceptions being sugar produced in Massachusetts
and New England rum, which was favored over West Indian rum. 
4
In 1783, Massachusetts passed a tariff law that imposed duties on "all
Goods, Wares and Merchandize [sic] of European and India Growth and
Manufacture ... that shall be imported by Land or Water from any foreign
Port, Island or Plantation, or any other State whatever, into this state, and
landed within the same."' I No discount or remission for goods landed
for re-export was permitted. 1 6 In 1784 another law was passed, increasing
the tariffs on foreign goods, especially on manufactured goods and some
foodstuffs. I -7 Finally, in 1786 Massachusetts repealed all of its prior tar-
iff laws, but new laws "marked the furthest advance of protectionism yet
reached in the state."',8 Ad valorem tariffs of fifteen percent were imposed
on manufactured goods and foodstuffs; a ten-percent ad valorem tariff was
imposed on wrought metals and foreign cordage; and a five-percent duty
was imposed "on all other goods, wares, and merchandise of foreign growth
and manufacture which would be brought in either by land or sea.... In
order to encourage manufacturers certain items could not be imported at
all." 9 While many of Massachusetts' tariff laws, especially those later ones,
exempted American-made or -grown goods, "some duties continued to be
levied against goods from other states. Like other states, Massachusetts
imposed tonnage fees, which increased between 1783 and 1785, and which
exempted only "vessels plying between the state's ports or engaged in the
fishing industry," which not coincidentally, were likely to be owned by
Massachusetts citizens.
E. Rhode Island
Stubborn Rhode Island, spoiler of all efforts to augment the revenue-rais-
ing powers of the Confederation Congress, passed a number of acts after
154 Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 198 (noting that only sugar
produced in Massachusetts was exempt from 1782 duties); id. at 205 (noting that under
Massachusett's 1782 tariff law; "[tihe only concession to American producers was to be found
in a provision for a lower rate from New England rum over West Indian").
155 Act of March 22, 1783, Ch. XXXII, ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS (1783) (emphasis added). Unless otherwise noted, all citations to
Massachusetts statutes can be found in the microfilmed copies of these laws, which were
published chronologically.
156 Id. Such a remission was apparently added the next year. Id. (citing Act of July i,
1784, Ch. XIII (1784)).
157 Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 201-02.
158 Id. at 203.
159 Id.
16o Id. at 207.
I6I Id. at ao8-o9.
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the Revolutionary War that raised money not only from foreign commerce,
but apparently from commerce originating in her sister states. In February
1783, an excise tax was placed on certain enumerated articles "for the
Purpose of paying the annual Interest arising upon the public Securities of
this State, or for raising a Revenue." 62 Among the articles included were
"New-England rum" and other "imported" goods, but no blanket exemp-
tion was available to goods grown or manufactured in the United States.63
In June of the same year, an additional two-percent ad valorem impost
was laid on "all Goods which shall be imported into this State, being of the
Growth or Manufacture of any foreign State, Island or Plantation."' Again,
there was no blanket exemption for the goods of other states; the refer-
ence to foreign states could have swept broadly to include the twelve other
former colonies. This impression is reinforced by the limited drawback on
the impost allowed to Rhode Island citizens importing foreign goods into
other states, who paid an impost of at least two percent.'6 5 Citizens of other
states would enjoy such a drawback only if their state provided a reciprocal
measure for Rhode Island citizens.'66A later act stated that citizens of other
states importing goods into Rhode Island "with the sole View of transport-
ing the same ... to some other State" would be permitted to do so duty-free
"[provided] the Owner... shall produce a Certificate... from the Collector
of Impost" from the point of origin "that an Impost as high as Two and an
Half per Cent. Has been paid on such Goods" and provided that the goods
are neither sold nor consumed in Rhode Island. 
6
,
In February 1785, the previous two-and-a-half percent ad valorem im-
post on other goods, including those imported from "foreign State[s]," was
retained;' 68 and in May, an additional seven-and-a-half percent ad valorem
duty was laid on British imports, bringing the total duty to ten percent,'69
which was followed by additional duties on other foreign goods in June."o
In October, Rhode Island prohibited the exportation of American goods
from Rhode Island ports in ships owned in whole or in part by British sub-
jects, and likewise closed its ports to imports brought in British bottoms." '
162 Act of Feb. 1783, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at 45.
163 td.
164 Act of June, 1783, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at 26.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 Act of Aug., 1784, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at io.
I68 Act of Feb., 1785, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at 25.
169 Act of May, 1785, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at 29.
170 See Act of June, 1785, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at I8.
171 Act of Oct., 1785, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at 29. An exception was made for ships
built in Rhode Island, and the act curiously required a copy of the act be transmitted to the
Governor of Connecticut.
2005-2006]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In December 1786, the 1783 impost was increased by two-and-a-half per-
cent, which again applied to goods imported from a "foreign State.""1
2
F South Carolina
In 1783 South Carolina passed an act imposing a duty on enumerated ar-
ticles and "a duty of Five per Centum on the value of all other goods im-
ported into this State from any foreign port, island, or plantation."'7 3 When
it became clear that duties were being imposed on goods imported from
other states, the South Carolina legislature immediately declared that "it is
injurious to that harmony which should ever subsist between these Federal
States, to impose any duties on the commodities of the respective states"",
74
and authorized the refund of duties paid "on any goods, wares, or mer-
chandizes, of the growth, produce, or manufacture of any of the United
States."" 1
5
Despite South Carolina's rejection of the discriminatory impost (at least
for interstate commerce), it did impose, in 1783, a nine-pence-per-ton duty
on all ships from out of state that arrived in one of its ports, ostensibly to
pay the salaries of port officers." 6 The tonnage duty was increased twice
during 1784 and 1785; in 1785 ships engaged in the coasting trade (i.e.,
navigating within the state) were also charged, though the rate was lower
than that for out-of-state ships.'7 7 According to William Zornow, " [t]hough
most of the states were willing to admit goods grown, produced, or manu-
factured in the other states, they did continue to discriminate on the matter
of tonnage duties."" 8 South Carolina's policy regarding tonnage duties was
thus consistent with the practices among the several states, though preva-
lence rendered it no less discriminatory.
V. STATE COMMERCIAL DISCRIMINATION: EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE
Not every state was engaged in commercial discrimination against its
neighbors. Even those states that did impose restrictive imposts and tariffs
often (but not always) took care to exempt from the higher tariffs goods
grown or produced in the other states. Does that mean, then, that Jensen
172 Act of Dec., 1786, RHODE ISLAND ACTS, at 2 1.
173 Act of Aug. 13, 1783, ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY... IN THE STATE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 1-2 (1783) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS]. All citations to the South Carolina
laws refer to the microformed collection of sessions laws published annually.
174 Act of Mar. 26, 1784, SoUTH CAROLINA ACTS 95 (1784).
175 Id. at 96.
176 Act of Aug. 13, 1783, SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS 1-2 (1783).
177 Zornow, South Carolina Tatiff Policies, supra note 27, at 39.
178 Id.
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was correct in his assessment that the issue of commercial discrimination
was a red herring thrown out by men who desired above all to create a
strong central government? In a series of articles published in the 195os,
historian William Zornow engaged in a survey of state legislation similar to
the one undertaken here and concluded that Jensen was right: state coop-
eration was the norm, and that the states were becoming more cooperative
with one another on commercial issues in the mid to late 178os, not less,
as the nationalists alleged. This Part argues that Zornow's interpretation
of the evidence in support of Jensen's thesis was overly generous and that
he largely ignores the role that the proposed Constitution of 1787 and its
successful ratification may have played in encouraging states to end their
parochial trade policies.
A. William Frank Zornow and the Question of
State Commercial Discrimination
Though Zornow's articles were published in a variety of journals between
1954 and 1956, 79 they all share common claims. First, he claimed that
Coxe's description of state commercial discrimination in his letter to theiSo
Annapolis Convention delegates was incorrect in several respects, and
in general wildly overstated the problem.'8 ' Second, he argued that what-
ever commercial discrimination did occur was either tempered by gener-
ous exemptions or was gradually eliminated. Finally, he asserted that "[bly
1789," states were "admitting American products duty free, [were] granting
special consideration to American ships as far as tonnage charges were con-
cerned, and [werej treating shippers from other states the same as ["their"]
own merchants."' 2 As the next part shows, however, Zornow's rosy conclu-
179 Seesupra note 27.
18o Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 5, 6; Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff
Policies, supra note 27, at 205-07; Zornow, New York Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 48; Zornow,
Virginia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 312, 313.
18I See, e.g., Zornow, New York Tariff Poliies, supra note 27, at 48 (describing Coxe's
claims about discrimination against American goods as "fallacious"); see also William Frank
Zornow, The Sandy HookLighthouse Incident of 1787, 14 J. ECON. HST. 26I,266(1954) [hereinafter
Zornow, The Sandy Hook Lighthouse Incident] (echoing Jensen; describing trade friction between
New York and New Jersey as "a teapot tempest at best").
182 Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at lO. Compare id. with Zornow,
Massachusetts Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 213 ("By 1789 Massachusetts, like her sister
states, was moving in the direction of greater cooperation in matters of American trade.
American products were being admitted duty free, and there was no attempt to discriminate
against shippers from the other states as far as duties or fees were concerned."), Zornow, New
York Tariff Laws, supra note 27, at 58 ("In 1789 New York like her sister states was admitting
American products duty free and was generally treating shippers from other states the same
as her own merchants. The spirit of cooperation in New York was becoming evident when
one considers her tariff policies adopted during this period."), Zornow, South Carolina Tariff
Policies, supra note 27, at 44 ("By 1789 the South Carolinians were moving in the direction of
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sions do not square with the evidence his survey of some state tariff poli-
cies musters.
Zornow's conclusions also raise two questions, neither of which he
answers. First, was it unreasonable for Coxe, Madison, and others to con-
clude, as they did, that without systemic reform, commercial discrimination
among the states might accelerate? Second, if cooperation was evinced by
1789, did the Constitution of 1787-specifically its relocation of commer-
cial regulatory power to Congress and its concomitant restrictions on state
power-contribute to that growing cooperation?
Unlike Jensen, who claimed that the so-called "Sandy Hook Lighthouse
Incident" was the only example of interstate commercial friction of note
during the Confederation Period,' 83 Zornow actually documents instances
of state discrimination, which largely track those I described in Part IV. As
this Part demonstrates, however, Zornow was determined to be a glass-
half-full optimist who saw incipient harmony, rather than impending crisis,
in the states' legislation. 8 6
Zornow acknowledged that Virginia, ' South Carolina, ' New York,
and Massachusetts discriminated to some degree against products com-
cooperation in all matters affecting tariff policies."), and Zornow, Virginia Tariff Policies, supra
note 27, at 318 ("By 1789 Virginia, like her sister states, was admitting American products
duty free, was granting special consideration to American ships as far as tonnage charges were
concerned, and was treating shippers from other states the same as her own merchants.").
183 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
184 Zornow, Virginia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 313 (acknowledging "some
evidence of discrimination and retaliation in the tariff and tonnage laws of Virginia"); id. at
315 (conceding that Virginia's tonnage laws discriminated at the time Coxe wrote his letter,
but arguing that the "situation ceased to exist.., in 1786 when the new tonnage fees went into
operation").
185 Zornow, South Carolina Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 35 (noting that South Carolina
discriminated against goods coming from other states until 1783-84, when it exempted
American goods from its impost and pursued a policy of free trade). But see id. at 38-39
(describing tonnage duty levied on ships coming into the South Carolina port from outside
the state; exemption for vessels owned by state residents "enraged merchants throughout the
country"); id. at 39 ("Though most of the states were willing to admit goods grown, produced,
or manufactured in the other states, they did continue to discriminate on the matter of tonnage
duties.").
186 Zornow, New York Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 48 (conceding that New York's
1788 tariff was protectionist); id. at 49 (noting "evidence of discrimination and retaliation in
the tariff and tonnage laws of New York"); id. at 50 (discussing tariff laws aimed at goods
coming from Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania); id. at 53 (noting
discrimination against out-of-state loaf sugar, tea, and hemp imposed in 1784; describing
tonnage fees that exempted New York ships).
187 Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 198 (noting that only sugar
produced in Massachusetts was exempt from 1782 duties); id. at 200 (discussing 1783 law
imposing tariff on goods from other states); id. at 205 (noting that Massachusetts' 1782 tariff law
"provided for a lengthy enumerated list of duties" including "[many] ... commodities [that]
were produced in neighboring states and were unquestionably subjected to the prevailing
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ing from other states, either through impost duties or by discriminatory
tonnage fees imposed on out-of-state ships. Zornow also conceded that dis-
criminatory tariffs played a role in the friction between New York and New
Jersey that produced the "Sandy Hook Lighthouse Incident of 1787." 8'
And yet, Zornow termed "fallacious"' 8 9 the claims made by Coxe, among
others, that many states were discriminating against interstate commerce
either through discriminatory tariffs that treated out-of-state products no
different (or worse) than foreign goods, or through tonnage duties that in-
directly taxed out-of-state imports. On the contrary, Zornow concluded that
every state he examined was moving toward economic cooperation and
free trade by 1789. '90 What discrimination that existed or remained by then,
duties"; "[t]he only concession to American producers was to be found in a provision for a
lower rate from New England rum over West Indian"); id. at 206-07 (noting that, after 1783,
"[tihere was an increasing tendency to admit American grown, produced, and manufactured
commodities duty free into Massachusetts' ports," but admitting that "some duties continued
to be levied against goods from other states"); id. at 208-09 (describing a tonnage duty on
ships entering Massachusetts ports, which exempted "only... vessels plying between the
state's ports or engaged in the fishing industry").
I88 See Zornow, The Sandy Hook Lighthouse Incident of 1787, supra note 18I, at 263-66.
189 Zornow, New York Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 48 ("It has already been
demonstrated that Coxe's claim that American products were discriminated against by the
tariff enactments of each state was fallacious."); Zornow, Virginia Tariff Policies, supra note 27,
at 312 (Coxe's objection "that American produced and grown goods were dutiable at equal or
higher rates than similar goods brought from foreign lands" was "not entirely true in Virginia");
see also Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 6 ("One of Coxe's objections had been
that American produced and grown goods were dutiable at equal or higher rates than similar
goods brought from foreign lands, but this was not true in Georgia."); Zornow, Massachusetts
Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 207 ("Coxe's claim that American products were discriminated
against by the tariff enactments in each state was not true in Massachusetts.").
19o See Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 1o ("By 1789 Georgia, like her
sister states, was admitting American products duty free, was granting special consideration
to American ships as far as tonnage charges were concerned, and was treating shippers from
other states the same as her own merchants. The criticism of men like Coxe was unfounded.");
Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 213 ("By 1789 Massachusetts, like her
sister states, was moving in the direction of greater cooperation in matters of American trade.
American products were being admitted duty free, and there was no attempt to discriminate
against shippers from other states as far as duties or fees were concerned."); Zornow, New York
Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 58 ("In 1789 New York like her sister states was admitting
American products duty free and was generally treating shippers from other states the same
as her own merchants. The spirit of cooperation in New York was becoming evident when
one considers her tariff policies adopted during this period."); Zornow, South Carolina Tariff
Policies, supra note 27, at 43, 44 ("By 1787 South Carolina was moving in the direction of
cooperating in tariff affairs not only with her sister states but with the central government
as well .... By 1789 the South Carolinians were moving in the direction of cooperation in all
matters affecting tariff policies."); Zornow, Virginia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 318 ("By
1789 Virginia, like her sister states, was admitting American products duty free, was granting
special consideration to American ships as far as tonnage charges were concerned, and was
treating shippers from other states the same as her own merchants. The spirit of cooperation
in Virginia was becoming quite evident, and it is apparent not only in dealings with other
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Zornow wrote, was aimed against foreign states that refused to conclude a
commercial treaty with the United States, '9' treated out-of-state products
no worse than those from other countries'92 (and better, in some cases' 93 ), or
was the exception rather than the norm. ' 94
Zornow's treatment of New York and New Jersey's clash over the Sandy
Hook Lighthouse is illustrative.'9 The incident, Zornow wrote, had been
overemphasized by those sympathetic to Fiske's "Critical Period" thesis,
and its repeated citation was contrary to what Zornow saw as the move-
ment towards greater cooperation among states on matters of trade.
196
Zornow argued that, in fact, the New York statute that so angered New
Jersey and Connecticut actually reduced some levies on ships from those
commonwealths.' 9" As with his discussion of specific states, Zornow's inter-
pretation stressed that the burden was not as much as contemporary writ-
ers and nineteenth-century historians claimed, though even his sanguine
states but in those with the central government as well.").
191 Zornow, Virginia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 313; see also Zornow, Georgia Tariff
Policies, supra note 27, at 1o ("Any discrimination that is evident in Georgia was directed
against foreign states which did not conclude a treaty with the United States."); Zornow,
New York Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 49 ("There was some evidence of discrimination
and retaliation in the tariff and tonnage laws of New York, but most of it was aimed against
foreign states rather than against other American states. The discrimination against England
is particularly noticeable."); Zornow, South Carolina Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 44 ("Any
discrimination in the South Carolina tariff legislation was directed against the British, while
other foreign countries which concluded commercial treaties with the United States were
accorded special concessions.").
192 See, e.g., Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 207 ("Although some
duties continued to be levied against goods from other states, they were in no case greater than
the duty being imposed on similar foreign goods."); Zornow, New York Tariff Policies, supra note
27, at 50 (discussing 1785 law subjecting goods imported from Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to duties imposed on goods imported in British-owned or -built
ships; explaining that "it was discrimination against products brought originally to the four
enumerated states in British bottoms").
193 See, e.g., Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 7 (discussing "special
reductions" in Georgia's tonnage fees "which were designed to encourage the American
merchant marine and commerce" and which were "a direct refutation of Coxe's claims");
Zornow, Virginia Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 315 (noting that "American ships were given
special concessions on the matter of tonnage charges over foreign ships").
194 See, e.g., Zornow, South Carolina Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 44 ("In some states
there was discrimination against vessels owned by non-residents of the enacting states in the
matter of tonnage fees, but in South Carolina this practice was minimized."); Zornow, Virginia
Tariff Policies, supra note 27, at 313 (noting that "[n]early every state sought to bring [England]
to terms by adopting some discriminatory legislation against West Indian and British trade").
195 See Zornow, The Sandy Hook Lighthouse Incident of 1787, supra note 181.
196 See id. at 261.
197 See id. at 264-65.
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interpretation of the incident included many examples of discrimination
that would have concerned the moderate nationalists.' 98
In late 1787, according to contemporary accounts, New York began im-
posing hefty tonnage fees on boats coming from New Jersey-fees that
treated New Jersey ships entering and clearing in New York ports like
other "foreign" ships. New Jersey, which had long wearied of having its
commerce taxed by New York, retaliated by imposing a hefty annual rent
on a New York lighthouse that sat at the tip of Sandy Hook, New Jersey.200
Zornow wrote, however, that to focus on the burden the New York statute
imposed on New Jersey's shipping was to miss its real significance: "When
one compares the New York law of 1787.... it can be clearly seen that in-
stead of being solely discriminatory it actually extended many privileges to
American ships from New Jersey and Connecticut that were overlooked by
contemporaries and later writers."20 '
In 1784, when the New York customs authority was established, the
law prescribed a fee of three pounds for any American-owned ship over
150 tons to enter and clear, one pound, ten shillings for ships between 70
202
and 150 tons, and sixteen shillings for ships less than 70 tons. Ships of
less than 20 tons traveling between states or between New York ports were
able to enter without fees, unless the goods they carried were subject to
tariff duties. Upon passage of the 1787 law, which triggered the punitive
rent on New York's lighthouse, "there was a substantial reduction of fees
amounting to fifty per cent on American-owned vessels under twenty tons,
and twenty-five per cent on ships from twenty to forty tons burden that
entered New York" from either Connecticut or New Jersey. 24 Reductions
for ships without dutiable goods were "even more marked.2 0 5
However, Zornow pointed out that "decked vessels of less than twenty
tons that carried American products ... were now subjected to a fee of two
shillings," meaning that "New Jersey farmers selling goods in New York
198 See id. at 262-65 (describing the commercial friction among New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut).
i99 Id. at 262.
200 Id. at 263.
201 Id.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 263-64.
204 Id. at 264 ("[Vlessels from forty to seventy tons paid twenty shillings, those from
twenty to forty tons paid twelve shillings, and those decked vessels under twenty tons burden
paid eight shillings. Undecked vessels entered free of charge.").
205 Id. ("Vessels of from forty to seventy tons burden paid only five shillings, which was
a saving of eleven shillings. Those from twenty to forty tons paid only three shillings, which
amounted to a reduction of thirteen shillings over the entrance and clearance fees collectible
under the law of 1784.") (footnote omitted).
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were compelled to pay a fee high enough to discourage their trade."' 6 He
repeated this later, writing that New York's 1787 tariff "was obviously de-
signed to check the importation of truck products from New Jersey and
Connecticut."20 7 New Jersey, which levied the heavy rent on New York's
lighthouse, and Connecticut, some of whose merchants boycotted New208
York markets, retaliated because of a "long period of ill feeling between
the... states" for whom "[tihe law of 1787 was the last link in a long chain
of injustices."
2
0,
Given Zornow's description, one might think him sympathetic to the
beleaguered states, which had long tired of trading under New York's siz-
able thumb; or at least understanding of their failure to be impressed with
what Zornow characterized as the law's reformist spirit. Instead, Zornow
expressed surprise that the focus would have been on what he considered
to be a relatively trivial increase in tariffs, and not on the concessions the
1787 act contained. Despite the discriminatory purpose of the 1787 tar-
iff-to disadvantage imports from New- Jersey-Zornow noted that such
goods could still be brought in without charge "in undecked vessels" and
added, without any support, that "it must have been true that a large per-
centage of the products entered via this type of transportation." 0 Why?
Given the desire to protect its own products, New York might just have
easily offered an exemption that was of little use to New Jersey merchants.
Given the history of commercial animosity between New York and New
Jersey, it is reasonable that any increase in tariffs on New York's part would
have been deeply resented, overshadowing any concessions (assuming the
concessions benefited New Jersey's merchants), which would, in any event,
likely have been regarded with considerable suspicion.
Zornow's treatment of the Sandy Hook Lighthouse Incident is consis-
tent with his Panglossian approach to state trade laws generally. In this
case, he concluded that the incident "was a teapot tempest at best" and
that "even this one example of discrimination among the states was tem-
wi,,
2 1 1
pered with exceedingly liberal concessions, just as he assumed that in-
stances of discrimination among state laws were incidental and paled in
comparison with the "trend" he saw towards trade liberalization by the
late 178Os. ' 2 Most interested observers of the time saw things differently.
States eager to gain commercial advantage and retain the revenue that
trade afforded, like New York, passed laws that palpably affected the com-
zo6 Id.
207 Id. at 265.
zo8 See id. at 265 n. Iz.
209 Id. at 265.
210 Id. at 264.
211 Id. at 266.
212 See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
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merce of other states. Aggrieved states retaliated. That this cycle persisted
on the eve of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution suggests that the con-
temporary observers had reason to be concerned. Zornow (and Jensen) said
those observers were either alarmists or were sounding the tocsin to further
their own economic interests-interests which benefitted from a stronger
central government.
Who is right? Was state discrimination a "teapot tempest" or had the
new union entered a "critical period," as John Fiske famously claimed?
Historians will likely continue to debate that question. But there are rea-
sons, outlined in the next section, which cast doubt on Zornow's optimistic
interpretation of events.
B. Evaluating Zornow
While Zornow undoubtedly performed a valuable service by reading and
describing state tariff laws, there are sound reasons to doubt his interpreta-
tion of 178os events. The first is his apparent lack of interest in whether
the Constitution played a role in the liberalization of trade by 1789. The
second concerns his use of Coxe's letter to the Virginia Commissioners as a
straw man, while ignoring much of what his own evidence suggested about
the state of commercial regulation during the Confederation era.
i. Zornow's Curious Omission.-It is interesting that Zornow chose the year
1789 as the year by which states had largely adopted policies of non-dis-
crimination towards out-of-state commerce but omitted any discussion of
the adoption of the Constitution of 1787, which limited state regulation
of commerce, as a possible causal factor in the liberalization of interstate
trade. Zornow's omission suggests that adoption of free-trade policies was
entirely due to an embrace of enlightened self-interest by the states them-
selves, as opposed to a reaction to the Constitution's new limitation of state
commercial regulation. As I shall show in the following part, the explicit
textual provisions placed in the Constitution were designed to eliminate
from states' regulatory repertoire the particular items-imposts and ton-
nage fees-that caused so much friction during the Confederation period.
Failure even to mention the Constitution of 1787 in the evolution of states'
tariff policies is, as the saying goes, to stage Hamlet without the Prince.
Zornow's omission is akin to a historian noting that slavery had disappeared
in the United States by i866 without mentioning either the Civil War or
the Thirteenth Amendment.
The question of whether states would have given up self-serving trade
policies in the absence of the Constitution is counterfactual and unanswer-
able with certainty. It is possible, but unlikely, that they would have. States
repeatedly rejected attempts to grant power over revenue and trade to the
central government. States ignored the free-trade provisions present in the
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Articles of Confederation, which were unenforceable in any event. The
trend in the mid-I78os was toward higher tariffs and tonnage duties in some
states. Even when ostensibly aimed at foreign trade, laws were passed to
discourage diversion of trade to states with low tariffs or with free ports. At
least one state used embargoes to create an artificial glut and lower prices
within the state, while raising prices in neighboring states. States did not
take this economic collateral damage lying down; the targets and victims of
such policies did not hesitate to pass retaliatory laws in response.
These facts, which were borne out by the laws that the states were pass-
ing, are relevant to making an assessment of whether the Framers exagger-
ated the degree of strife, or whether they were alarmist in their assessments
about the likely fate of the United States. Zornow claimed his evidence
supported Jensen's conclusion that the Framers' fears were exaggerated
and they stoked a sense of crisis to get the strong national government
they favored, and which would be favorable to their economic interests.
The next section describes why one should have second thoughts about
Zornow's and Jensen's conclusions.
2. Does Zornow Prove the Nationalists Were Alarmists?-Zornow seemed
committed to disproving the Critical Period thesis and clearly aligned
himself with Jensen's revisionist view. He marched through the relevant
impost and tonnage statutes in all of his articles toward the inevitable con-
clusion that criticisms, like those of Coxe in 1786, that states were forcing
their neighbors to pay higher imposts and tonnage duties than they were
charging foreign countries was totally false, and that, in fact, the trend dur-
ing the Confederation period was towards a policy of universal free trade
for interstate goods. The problem is not so much that Zornow missed the
evidence (as Jensen did). The problem, rather, is in his interpretation of
those materials, which is seriously deficient. Careful attention to what
exactly Zornow did in his articles, moreover, shows there to be less than
meets the eye.
First, Zornow took Coxe's letter literally. What Zornow set out to refute,
then, was not so much the propositions that state discrimination existed, that
it worried political leaders, and that they committed themselves to reform-
ing the governmental structure that provided no effective remedy against
such discrimination, but something more specific. Zornow took Coxe's
complaints at face value, and attempted to show that (i) most American-
made products were exempted from tariffs, even if some discriminatory
tonnage duties were left in place, and (2) out-of-state goods were not gen-
erally treated worse than foreign goods, as Coxe claimed. Finally, Zornow
pressed his argument that the overall trend was toward trade liberalization,
at least by 1789.
As noted above, the choice of 1789 is an important qualification that
does not necessarily refute the Critical Period thesis. Fiske himself might
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agree: yes, by 1789 free trade was the order of the day-because the national-
ists succeeded in framing and successfully ratifying a constitution that mandated
free trade policies.
Second, as noted earlier, the exemptions in place for domestic manu-
facturers do not necessarily mean that there was perforce no discrimina-
tion against out-of-state commerce. Whatever their aim-raising revenue,
piecemeal retaliation at Great Britain-many of the tariffs and tonnage
duties affected merchants and consumers of other states, either because
out-of-state merchants operating in states with free ports found their goods
taxed as they moved them into another state for sale, or because states with
advantageous ports took advantage of their locale by imposing heavy duties
on goods eventually consumed in states, like New Jersey or Rhode Island,
which lacked good port facilities. Simply because the tariffs were not always
aimed at "New England rum," "Virginia tobacco," or "Massachusetts tex-
tiles" does not mean that they affected other states' merchants any less.
Third, that out-of-state goods were often treated on par with foreign
goods-that is, they were not taxed at a higher rate than foreign goods-
can hardly be taken as a mark of trade liberalization in the Confederation
period. The Constitution-even the Articles of Confederation-required
out-of-state commerce to be treated no worse than the internal commerce
of the states. Moreover, states were theoretically restricted from interfer-
ing with commercial treaties negotiated by the Confederation government
with foreign countries.
Finally, Zornow's conclusions gloss over the fact that real discrimina-
tion against domestic goods and against particular states did occur. Coxe's
statement might have been a bit of chamber-of-commerce boosterism de-
signed to show Pennsylvania in a good light,2' 3 but his complaints were not
entirely fictional, even if they were incorrect in certain particulars.
One does not have to accept Fiske's extreme characterization of the
Confederation period to conclude, pace Zornow and Jensen, that interstate
discrimination (along with the general lack of mechanism to effect a uni-
form national trade policy) was hindering the development of the United
States and was, by 1787, causing friction among its constituent members.
Historian Richard Morris, commenting on the writings of Jensen and oth-
ers, put the matter this way: "Despite an overwhelming body of evidence
to the contrary, sympathizers with the Antifederalist position have charged
that the bad times of the postwar years were the figment of the imagi-
nation of nationalist propagandists."2 V4 As the economy worsened in the
mid-178os," s states levied tariffs "[tlo secure revenue, prevent dumping of
213 See JACOB E. COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 96 (1978).
214 MORRIS, supra note 37, at 133.
215 According to Morris, 1784 was the year of the first American depression. See id. at
134.
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foreign goods, and protect emerging native industries"; the revenue thus
obtained inured to the benefit of the states and not to Congress."' Morris
commented that
the state tariffs failed to provide a truly common market within the thir-
teen states, a major objective of the laterfederal Constitution. In addition to being
discriminatory, they lacked uniformity in the degree of protection offered
home industry and production, and their objectives diverged as regards the
trade patterns they sought to shape .
Perhaps more important is what the Framers saw as the perceived threat
to the union posed by the legislative activity of the states. As Clinton
Rossiter wrote,
Whether the United States in 1787 was in truth on the edge of dissolution is
a question that will be argued among historians until the United States is no
more. That a majority of the continental elite believed this to be the truth is
the most solid, incontrovertible fact in the records of that year. 18
The Framers' contemporary comments bear out this observation.
Alexander Hamilton spoke for many when he wrote in The Federalist No.219
22 that "interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, con-
216 Id. at 148.
217 Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
218 CLINTON RoSSITER, 1787:THYE GRAND CONVENTION 57 (1966). Madison's biographer
made a similar point:
Though the economic distress, commercial warfare, and paper money
"depravity" of the Confederation may have been exaggerated by
Madison and others at the time, and by "critical period" historians ever
since, it is important to remember that Madison's anxiety and concern
rested as much on tendencies as on actuality. The amicable settlement of
some disputes among states was to him less significant than the looming
unresolved issues. He declaimed not about the lack of patriotism of
the defenders of state supremacy, but against their unwisdom and their
failure to envision the inevitable debilitation that would result from
the deficient authority of the general government under the Articles
of Confederation.... Madison was convinced that in the long run the
United States required government over, not negotiation among, its
constituent parts.
RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 176 (Univ. Press of Va. 199o) (1971) (footnote
omitted); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, On Tariffs Versus Subsidies in Interstate Trade: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127, ii81 n.267 (1996) ("[W]hat matters most for
interpretive purposes is not what actually happened, but what the founders believed had
happened or could happen.").
219 I assume that the views expressed in The Federalist are reliable statements (if
occasionally finessed) of the views and opinions of the primary authors, Madison and Hamilton.
On the reliability of The Federalist for constitutional interpretation, see generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court ReadThe Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?,
66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998).
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trary to the true spirit of the Union, [had] given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others." 2 He further warned "that examples of this nature,
if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended
till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than in-
jurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the
Confederacy."22 ' Comparing the present situation to the German empire
and to the "multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states
[in Germany] exact upon the merchandises passing through their territo-
• ,222
ries," Hamilton wondered whether "we may reasonably expect, from the
gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at
length come to be considered and treated" by other states as "foreigners
and aliens.,
23
One commentator remarked that "historians may well be correct that
there were in reality far fewer interstate trade barriers than once be-
lieved."' 2 4 The fact remains, however, that these same historians have ex-
cessively downplayed the level of discrimination that existed as well as
how that discrimination was perceived by men like Madison, who only
came to the conclusion that the Articles required major revision reluctantly,
and have ignored the possibility that the Framers' actions were not only
reactive, but also prophylactic, seeking a measure of protection against fur-
ther future disputes. As Professor Drahozal noted, "Even if those disputes
were relatively rare, they did happen and could have happened again if not
guarded against in the Constitution." 25 It is those constitutional safeguards
to which I turn in the next section.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE COMMERCIAL REGULATION
In this part, I argue that constitutional protections against interstate dis-
crimination, which constitute the bulwark of the modern DCCD, find their
origins in four provisions of the 1787 Constitution. First, the Commerce
Clause, which committed power to regulate interstate commerce to
Congress, was seen mainly as a restraint on state power. This affirmative
grant of power was bolstered by the three explicit limitations on state pow-
er: the Import-Export Clause, the Tonnage Clause, and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV. I begin, however, with the drafting history
of the Articles of Confederation, the provisions of which furnish a response
220 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hereinafter all citations are to this edition.
221 Id. at 144-45.
222 Id. at 145.
223 Id.
224 Drahozal,supra note 218, at i18o n.267.
225 Id. at i i8o-8i n.267.
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to those who assume that the era's concern for preservation of state sover-
eignty render any historical or textual arguments for the DCCD untenable.
In fact, from the early days of the Republic, a concern existed that control
of commerce could serve as a wedge between"states, and handicap the in-
cipient union. The Articles themselves provided nascent protections for
interstate commerce, though not as many as their drafters would have pre-
ferred. The lack of any enforcement mechanism in the Articles, however,
rendered the protections that survived entirely theoretical.
A. State Commercial Regulation and the Articles of Confederation
Early drafts of the Articles of Confederation, written by John Dickinson,
included significant restraints on the power of states to discriminate against
interstate commerce. Though many of Dickinson's provisions were not ad-
opted by the Continental Congress, the articles, as ratified, were not wholly
lacking in protections for interstate commerce. Limited in scope and un-
enforceable as they were, the provisions of the articles regarding treaties,
trade, and the treatment of other states' citizens nevertheless suggest that
some embryonic principle of economic union was emerging despite the ar-
226ticles' well-documented preservation of near-absolute state sovereignty.
As early as 1776, just after independence, pamphleteers were calling for
the formation of a general government of the newly independent states that
would make "general regulations respecting trade."2 7 John Dickinson, the
Pennsylvanian who headed a committee charged with drafting the Articles
of Confederation, understood that uniformity could not be obtained ifS 228
states were accorded complete power over their commercial regulations.
Dickinson's draft of the articles included a number of interesting protec-
tions for interstate commerce. 29 Two of the articles "would have prohibited
the states from enacting measures discriminating against the inhabitants of
other colonies, most importantly in matters of trade." 230 First, "[ilnhabitants
of each Colony" were guaranteed "the same Rights, Privileges and advan-
226 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II.
227 JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITIcs: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 149 (1979).
228
Implicit in (Dickinson's] conception of confederation... was the premise
that the states were incapable of entirely regulating their activities in the
best interest of union, and that any plan of confederation would therefore
have to impose restraints on their sphere of action-and not merely in
areas that obviously required the general direction of Congress.
Id. at 152.
229 See Josiah Bartlett's and John Dickinson's Draft Articles of Confederation (June 17,
1776), in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 233 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1979)
[hereinafter Dickinson Draft].
23o RAKOVE, supra note 227, at 153.
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tages in all Cases whatever in the other Colonies, which they now have."23'
They were also to enjoy "all the Rights, Liberties, Priviledges [sic],
Exemptions & Immunities in Trade, Navigation & Commerce in every
Colony, and in going to & from the same, which the Natives of such Colony
enjoy. 232 The same article also stated that "[n]o Colony shallassess or lay any
Duties or Imposts on the Importation of the Productions or Manufactures of anoth-
er Colony, nor settle or establish any Fees for Entries, Clearances, or any Business
whatever relative to Importation or Exportation."233 However, the new states
retained the power to levy duties and imposts on foreign commerce, as long
as those impositions did not conflict with treaties of the United States34
As historian Jack Rakove wrote: "When [Dickinson] proposed ... pro-
hibiting the states from discriminating against each other's citizens, he rec-
ognized how easily questions of interests could evoke interstate conflicts.
Dickinson clearly intended to use confederation as a vehicle not only for
defining the powers of Congress but also for limiting the authority of the
states. 23 Unfortunately, others on Dickinson's committee did not share
his vision and stymied his efforts to "minimize the most obvious sources
of internal conflict" 236 threatening the national unity "that all whig leaders
continued to agree was necessary to American success. ' 237 In the end, the
Committee deleted the prohibition on interstate commercial discrimina-
tion and converted the grant of authority to levy duties and imposts on
foreign commerce into a grant to levy them on all imports and exports.23
After the draft was debated in Congress, the remaining restraints were re-
moved as well.239 "Congress rejected the ... Articles, which contained the
231 Dickinson Draft, supra note 229, at 236.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 See id. at 237:
Each Colony may assess or lay such Imposts or Duties, as it thinks proper,
on Importation or Exportations (to the British Dominions, or any foreign
Kingdom or State, on the Importation of the productions or Manufactures of
such [...] or any foreign Kingdom or State from another Colony), provided
such Imposts or Duties do not interfere with any Stipulations in Treaties
hereafter entered into by the Union, with the King or Kingdom of
Glreat] B[ritain] or with any foreign Prince or State.
235 RAKOVE, supra note 227, at 157.
236 Id. at 158.
237 Id.
238 See Dickinson Draft, supra note 229, at 237. Compare 5JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 547-48 (Government Printing Office ed., 19o6) (reprinting the first
copy laid before Congress).
239 See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 238, at 674-
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prohibitions against state measures that would discriminate against citizens
of other states." 40
At first glance, the actions of the Continental Congress suggest a com-
plete repudiation of Dickinson's vision for the confederacy and a shift in
the focus from addressing possible sources of conflict within the constitu-
ent members of the new nation to a jealous protection of state sovereignty
against encroachment from the new Congress. 4 ' However, some restric-
tions on the power of states were reintroduced and became part of the docu-
242
ment that was'eventually ratified by the states.
Article IV-the progenitor of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV of the U.S. Constitution 241-(I) granted to citizens of each state
the rights of "free ingress and regress" to and from the several states; (2)
guaranteed the "privileges of trade and commerce" in the states on the
same terms as citizens of those states; and (3) secured the right to remove
"property imported into any state, to any other state" inhabited by the
owner of that property.2 Article VI echoed Dickinson's limitation on the
power of states over foreign commerce and forbade the laying of imposts
and duties by states in any manner that interfered with proposed treaties
with France and Spain.245 Article IX stated that the Confederation Congress
had the "sole and exclusive right and power of... entering into treaties
and alliances," but provided that no commercial treaties could be made
whereby states were "restrained from imposing such imposts and duties
on foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the
exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatso-
ever."' 246 Note, however, that by negative implication Congress could have,
by treaty, restrained states from laying imposts and duties greater than those
to which their own citizens were subject-an additional (if only a potential)
restraint on the states.
As Rakove pointed out, "[elach of these prohibitions involved some
function of government related to the internal police of the states but
whose exercise could prove inimical to the tranquility of the union."
'141
Though the final draft provided explicit protections for state sovereign-
248
ty and insured that states would have near-absolute power to regulate
240 RAKOVE, supra note 227, at 160.
241 See id.
242 Seeid. at 181--8z.
243 See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § z.
244 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
245 See id. art VI.
246 Id. art. IX.
247 RAKOVE, supra note 227, at I81.
248 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.").
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their own affairs, "the confederation would nevertheless establish certain
limits on their sovereignty other than those required by the exigencies of
war and diplomacy."249 Far from repudiating Dickinson's earlier work, the
Continental Congress, in part, adopted a few of his principes.
5 0
Thus, even during the high-water mark for the constitutional protection
of state sovereignty, the delegates drafting the Articles of Confederation
recognized that interstate discrimination in commercial matters was in-
consistent with the project of union on which the states had embarked.
Moreover, as we shall see, some of the language deleted from Dickinson's
initial draft tracks language that became part of the Constitution.
B. The Constitution of 1787 and Restrictions on
State Regulation of Commerce
i. The Commerce Clause.-The Framers in Philadelphia solved one of the
problems that bedeviled the Confederation Congress-inability to pass
uniform trade policies and raise revenue-by empowering Congress to "lay
and collect Taxes," including "Duties, Imposts, and Excises, as well as
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with Indian Tribes."2 2 Though the degree to which the latter
grant of power itself implicitly restrained states and whether courts are war-
ranted in enforcing any implicit restriction are questions at the heart of the
controversy over the DCCD, it appears that the grant of power to Congress
was intended as a corrective to the state commercial regulation regimes
under the Articles of Confederation.
Madison famously propounded this "restrain-the-states" thesis in
1829, writing that the Commerce Clause "grew out of the abuse of the
power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was in-
tended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among
the States themselves. 25 3 Madison's letter has often been cited as author-
ity for the DCCD, s4 though critics have argued that neither members of
the Philadelphia Convention nor delegates to state ratifying conventions
shared Madison's views.2 5 Then-professor Felix Frankfurter once flatly
249 RAKOVE,supra note 227, at 182.
250 For an earlier description of the fate of Dickinson's draft, see MERRILL JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1-781, at 133, 137-39, 177-78 (1940).
251 U.S. CONsT. art. I,§ 8, cl. I.
252 Id. at cl. 3.
253 Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprintedin 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter
RECORDS].
254 See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,193 n.9 (1994).
255 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,613 n.7 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
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declared that the notion that "the mere grant of the commerce power to
Congress dislodged state power finds no expression" in the debates of the
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention or in the debates of state ratify-
256ing conventions. Given the extent to which the Framers were concerned
with state regulatory mischief, it would be surprising to find no support for
this proposition, which the Supreme Court has itself invoked in support
of the DCCD. As Barry Cushman has pointed out, prior to the late nine-
teenth century, litigation involving the Commerce Clause involved not the
affirmative power of the federal government, but the restrictions on state
regulation of commerce."' The analytical categories with which the Court
wrestled, and ultimately abandoned after 1937, in fact were largely the flip
side of the analytical categories developed for applying the DCCD.
In 1941, five years after Frankfurter dismissed arguments that the grant
of power over commerce could be construed as an implicit restriction on
state power, Albert Abel published an exhaustive survey of the extant re-. .. .. 258
cords of both the Philadelphia and state ratifying conventions. Abel con-
cluded that the majority sentiment was in favor of federal exclusivity in
matters of commercial regulation of primary concern to conventions, viz.,
the impediments to trade canvassed above, which set states against one
another in matters of trade. Abel found "strik[ing]" the "nearly universal
agreement that the federal government should be given the power of regu-
lating commerce," that the lack of power under the Confederation was a
hindrance to union, and that "its grant" would be "a major and indubitable
boon of union."5 9 Not only was the Commerce Clause adopted unani-
mously, and without debate in Philadelphia, but "[in the ratifying conven-
dissenting);seealso Redish & Nugent,supra note 2, at 587-88; Lisa Heinzerling, TheCommercial
Constitution, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 217, 219 n.12 (1995).
256 FELIX FRANKFURTER, 111E COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE
13(0937).
257 See generally Barry Cushman, Formalism andRealism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. IO89 (2000).
258 Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941).
259 Id. at 443-44. Elsewhere, he wrote:
An outstanding defect under the articles, it was commonly felt,
was the lack of power in the United States either to raise a revenue
to meet expenses and discharge the continental debt or to cope with
discriminatory commercial regulations of foreign countries, in particular
of Great Britain .... Moreover, the states were using their imposts as
weapons against each other, either offensively, as where the importing
states imposed tariffs the ultimate incidence of which was calculated
to fall on others not blessed by geography with as good and accessible
harbors, or defensively, as by strengthening their tariff walls against each
other to compensate for revenue deficiencies resulting from diversion of
foreign shipments to the states with the least onerous imposts.
Id. at 448-49 (footnotes omitted). See also supra Part II.
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tions," Abel noted, "the same lack of opposition is disclosed.
During the debates in Philadelphia, Abel wrote that the references to
interstate commerce made there were notable for their "paucity,Z , but
nevertheless concluded that the Commerce Clause "was uniformly men-
tioned as a device for preventing obstructive or partial regulations by the
states."'262 In the nine times that Abel found the subject arose, the context
was the potential for the Commerce Clause to remedy state predation on
one another, mainly through import or export duties or navigation fees,
263like tonnage duties. 6 In every instance, however, "the grant of power to
Congress was conceived of as preventing states from levying tribute on
movements in commerce to and from other states.
' '264
There was even less commentary at the state ratifying conventions.
Abel discussed a Massachusetts writer who opposed granting commercial
regulatory power to Congress, apparently based on the writer's "evident
satisfaction with the superior commercial position of his home state" and a
desire that "it be allowed to remain in a position to adopt such commercial
regulations as it pleased without let or hindrance. ' '26 s Similarly, advocates of
ratification in New York charged opponents with a "reluctance ... to see the
revenues arising from commercial exactions, ultimately paid by citizens of
neighboring states, slip from their fingers."' 66 These comments, as well as
the "occasional references to the chaotic condition of existing commercial
relations between the states," Abel wrote, "assumed that adoption of the
constitution would terminate the conflicting and prejudicial fiscal burdens
z6o Id. at 444. "[Flor the most part, the severest critics of the constitution expressly
disclaimed any hostility to [federal control of commerce] and bore testimony that, be the
blemishes in other respects what they might, this particular grant of authority was a good and
wholesome provision and had their approval." Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).
261 Id. at 470.
z6z Id. at 47 I.
263 Abel then broke down the numbers:
In three ... instances reference was made to the potentialities of the
clause as affording a means of protection against injury inflicted by
hostile or harmful restrictions or regulations of sister states, without
intimating what particular type of state commercial regulation was
thus to be stricken down.... The other six all refer in like manner to
the anticipated operation of the grant in preventing discriminatory
commercial regulations by states, but mention particular subjects of
legislation as being affected. Twice the restraining effect of the grant
is mentioned in connection with state export duties. Once it seems to
have been involved in an interchange with regard to a state impost on
imports.
Id. at 470-71.
264 Id. at 472.
z65 Id.
266 Id. (footnote omitted).
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imposed by the several states on each other's commerce, and ... are in line
with the sentiments of the framers.2
67
Combined with Madison and Hamilton's analysis in The Federalist
Papers, which "recommended [national control of interstate commerce]
as a desirable corrective of state discrimination and as a useful incidental
power in the promotion of foreign trade,"' 26' Abel concluded that "the ex-
tant contemporary evidence ... tends to confirm Pinckney's and Madison's
recollection that the power as to commerce between the states was in the
main a 'negative and preventive provision' and "a shield against state ex-
actions."20
Abel's evidence as to the intent and understanding of the purpose of
granting Congress control over interstate commerce strongly suggests that
the DCCD could be justified solely on the basis of Article I, Section 8's af-
firmative grant of power.2' ° But the DCCD need not depend solely on the
Commerce Clause for textual and historical support. In the remaining sec-
267 Id. at 472-73.
268 See id. at 475; see also id. at 474-75. Abel wrote that the analysis in The Federalist
Papers:
of the power over commerce between the states comes down to two main
propositions. First, state regulations, particularly those of a fiscal nature,
were already galling; their removal was essential, as demonstrated by
foreign examples and American sentiment, and should be effected by
confiding regulation of commerce to the federal government. Second,
power over interstate commerce was desirable as a collateral power to
the control of foreign commerce, inasmuch as the removal of barriers to
interstate trade erected by state restrictions and exactions would extend
the available commercial resources and so tend to stabilize mercantile
activity.
Id. at 475.
269 Id. at 475.
27o DCCD critics might object that Abel's evidence proves only that the withdrawal of
power was merely potential, awaiting congressional exercise, and says nothing about judicial
enforcement. I discuss this objection infra Part VII.
After I completed this article, I became aware of Professor Calvin Johnson's work on the
origins of the Constitution. According to Professor Johnson, the anti-discrimination norm-
that states should not discriminate against the commerce of other states-was reflected in the
Articles of Confederation, and "was strongly felt, but unchallenged and so not written down in
the Constitution." Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuitiesfrom theArticles of
Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463,463 (2003-2004). Professor Johnson
also argues, with Abel, that the scope of Congress' commerce power was fairly limited, given
the existence and acceptance of that norm. See generally Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda's Thumb:
The Modest and Mercantilist Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
I (2oo4). He would thus disagree with my assertion that the Commerce Clause was intended
to serve as a significant restraint on the states. See generally CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS
ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (2OO5). While
we both agree that there is nothing illegitimate about the DCCD, I think we disagree as to
the widespread adherence to the norm of non-discrimination during the Confederation period
and the extent to which the principle ended up being reflected in the Constitution's text.
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tions, I discuss explicit textual restrictions on state commercial power that
nicely complement the affirmative grant of congressional power. Taken to-
gether, the combination of grants and restrictions provide ample support
for what the Court has been enforcing under the DCCD.
2. The Import-Export Clause.27'-The Import-Export Clause was tailor-
made for the paradigm case of state discrimination against imports from
and exports to other states, as well as to and from other countries. Critics
of the DCCD who claim that if the Commerce Clause was meant to be ex-
clusive there would have been a corresponding restriction on the states in
Article I, Section IO completely ignore the Import-Export Clause, which is
the most natural textual locus for the anti-discrimination principle.272 One
reason for this lack of attention must be the assumption that imports and ex-
ports refer exclusively to goods that come into the country from outside the
United States. Indeed this was the erroneous reading given to the Clause
by the Supreme Court in the 1869 case of Woodruff v. Parham. In that
case-and contrary to a previous decision written by Chief Justice Taney,
who in turn relied on dictum from Chief Justice Marshall-Justice Miller
concluded that it was "reasonable to suppose that the general usage" of the
terms import and export in 1869 was the same as that during the framing era
and that those terms excluded interstate imports and exports.274
As many others 275 (myself included)276 have argued, the WoodruffCourt's
assumption was completely mistaken. The survey of state commercial leg-
271 The discussion in this section draws on that in Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas,
the Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
155 (1999).
272 Justice Thomas, as noted above, is an exception.
273 Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869). For a complete discussion of the
case and a critique of its reasoning, see Denning, supra note 271, at 162-63, 182-215.
274 Woodruff, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 131. Compare id. with Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 169, 172-74 (I861) (striking down a law requiring tax stamp on bills of lading for
gold and silver exported from California "to any point or place without the State"); Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827) (interpreting the Import-Export Clause to
prohibit occupation tax imposed on importers, as applied to an importer engaged in foreign
commerce; adding in dicta, that "we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply
equally to importations from a sister State").
275 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 624-25 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Import-Export Clause was intended to apply equally to
interstate, as well as foreign commerce); WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, I POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 297 (1953); Drahozal, supra note 218,
at 1176 ("Imports, within the meaning of the Import-Export Clause, should include all goods
brought into a state from without. The term certainly includes goods brought from foreign
countries into the United States, but its meaning should not be so limited, as the historical
record makes clear.") (footnote omitted); E. Parmalee Price, Congress, and the Regulation of
Corporations, 19 HARv. L. REV. i68, 192 (I906).
276 See Denning, supra note 271, at 182-2I5.
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islation above confirms my earlier conclusion that the terms import and ex-
port could refer either to interstate or foreign commerce. In state statutes
passed during the Confederation period, whenforeign imports and exports
were the only things meant to be covered in a statute, either the word
foreign was used, or the statute included a blanket exemption for imports
or exports grown or manufactured in other states. Given that the states
related to one another as sovereigns at that time, even the use of the word
foreign could give rise to misunderstandings. Recall South Carolina's 1783
law imposing "a duty of Five per Centum on all other goods imported
into this State from any foreign port, island, or plantation," which it later
clarified did not apply to interstate imports, after many such imports had
had the impost levied on them. Virginia took the opposite tack, passing
an additional statute declaring everything outside the boundaries of Old
Dominion to be foreign for purposes of her impost and duty statutes, after
some argued that the use of the word foreign implicitly excluded commerce
from the other states.277
General usage of import and export aside, when one recalls the language
from the Dickinson draft of the Articles of Confederation in light of the
circumstances facing the delegates in Philadelphia, any latent ambiguity in
the Import-Export Clause evaporates. Dickinson had sought to prohibit all
"Duties or Imposts on the Importation of the Productions or Manufactures
of another Colony," but left the states free to impose duties and impost on
foreign commerce, as long as such impositions did not violate any treaty of
the United States.2 8 Experience taught the necessity of restraining states
in both interstate and foreign commerce. Article I, Section io, reflected the
lessons learned and made no distinction between interstate and foreign
imports or exports. A contemporary reader would naturally have inferred
that both types of commerce were beyond the states' reach. In fact, "in its
primordial form the prohibition of state imposts appeared merely as a qual-
ifying clause in a section of the commerce clause, 279 reinforcing the notion
that the prohibition extended to interstate as well as foreign commerce
and the idea Professor Frankfurter found so heretical: that the Commerce
Clause constrained state power as well as empowered Congress.
3. The Tonnage Clause.-Article I, Section IO also contains a prohibi-
tion-similar to Dickinson's suggested prohibition on "fees for Entries
[or] Clearances ... relative to Importation or Exportation"Z0---on duties
of tonnage laid by states without congressional consent. Tonnage duties
were laid on the carrying capacity of ships and were a popular method of
277 For discussion of both statutes, see Part IV supra.
278 See supra notes 228-25o and accompanying text.
279 Abel, supra note 258, at 450.
28o See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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raising revenue during the Confederation period .21 This clause was added
at the Philadelphia Convention to settle an interpretive dispute that had
arisen concerning whether the Commerce Clause, by itself, forbade the
states from levying tonnage duties to offset, for example, the cost of erect-
212ing lighthouses along the coast.
At the convention, the delegates from Maryland moved that a clause
be added to allow states to lay tonnage duties "for the purpose of clearing
harbours and erecting light-houses. ' 283 Gouverneur Morris noted that as
the draft of the Constitution then stood, states were not forbidden to lay
tonnage duties, and the Maryland proposal might, by negative implication,
284further restrain the states' power. Madison responded that whether states
were already restrained or not depended upon the scope of the Commerce
Clause. While "[t]hese terms are vague," he allowed, they "seem to ex-
clude this power of the States." ' John Langdon of New Hampshire then
"insisted that the regulation of tonnage was an essential part of the regula-
tion of trade, and that the States ought to have nothing to do with it," and
proposed the language of the Tonnage Clause, which then passed 6 to 4.286
Langdon's response was directed at Roger Sherman, who remarked that he
thought the power over commerce could exist concurrently in the states
and Congress, and that "[tihe power of the U[nited] States to regulate trade
being supreme can controul [sic] interferences of the State regulations"
287,
when and if they occurred. Sherman's arguments failed to convince a
majority of the Convention.
The Tonnage Clause was a sensible supplement to the Import-Export
Clause. Without it, states could have evaded the Import-Export Clause by
levying duties on ships from out of state, or from foreign countries. "If the
states had been left free to tax the privilege of access by vessels to their
harbors the prohibition [of the Import-Export Clause] could have been
nullified by taxing the vessels transporting the merchandise.",
2
1
Despite the obvious relationship between the two clauses, unlike the
Import-Export Clause, the Tonnage Clause has never been confined to for-
281 See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex tnl. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261, 265
(1935) ("duties of tonnage .. were known to commerce as levies upon the privilege of access
by vessels.., to the ports or to the territorial limits of a state").
28z See 2 RECORDS, supra note 253, at 625-26.
283 Id. at 625.
284 See id.
285 Id. He further commented that "[hie was more & more convinced that the regulation
of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority." Id.
(footnote omitted).
286 Id. at 625-26.
287 Id. at 625.
288 Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex r/. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261, 265
(1935).
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eign commerce, contrary to the Woodruff Court's claim that "duties" were
only levied on foreign commerce. Two years after Woodruff, the Court
assumed not only that the Tonnage Clause covered interstate commerce,
but also emphasized the connection among the Commerce, Import-Export,
and Tonnage Clauses.' 90 Curiously, the State Tonnage Tax Cases made no
mention of the recehtly decided Woodruff case. 9'
4. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV-This article, the di-
rect descendant of the Articles of Confederation provision guaranteeing
292
equal rights for trade and commerce, is another significant limitation on
state commercial power and a crucial textual source for the anti-discrimi-
nation principle that the Court enforces through the DCCD. Called by
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 8o the "basis of the Union," 293 the purpose of
this clause, according to the Supreme Court, is to require from states "sub-
stantial equality of treatment for resident[s] and nonresident[s]" unless
there exists a "substantial reason" for a distinction that "bears a substantial
relationship to the State's objective. Critics have long urged that the
DCCD be discarded in favor of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 95
As I have shown elsewhere, though, those anxious to find a textual hook
for the DCCD's antidiscrimination principle would have to countenance
a host of non-textual doctrinal contortions lest their preferred substitute
simultaneously provide less protection against discrimination and impose
289 Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 132 (1869).
290 See State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214-15, 225 (1871); see also
Peete v. Morgan, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 58I, 584 (i873) (holding that the Tonnage Clause applies
"[miuch more... when the vessels are owned by citizens of another State, and are engaged in
commerce between the States"); Denning, supra note 271, at 184-86.
291 Denning, supra note 271, at 185.
292 See FARRAND, supra note 7o , at 127-28 (stating that "the document which proved
to be of the most service to [the Committee of Detail charged with fashioning a draft of the
Constitution] was the articles of confederation"and that "the insurance of interstate privileges
were taken directly from the articles of confederation").
293 THE FEDERALIST No. 8o, supra note 22o, at 478; see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 18o (1869) (stating that the Clause intended to "place the citizens of each State
upon the same footing with citizens of other States" relieving them "from the disabilities of
alienage" and "inhibit[ing] discriminating legislation against them by other States").
294 Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 522 U.S. 287, 297-298 (1998) (citation omitted);
see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526-27 (1978) (state statute seeking to treat residents
and nonresidents differently must be substantially related to solving problem uniquely
presented by nonresidents); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (holding that Clause
"was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges
which the citizens of State B enjoy" including the right to "do[] business in State B on terms
of substantial equality" with residents).
295 See Brannon P Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot
Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 385-87 (2003) and sources
cited therein.
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greater restrictions on the states and on Congress. Better to view the clause
as a supplement to-not a replacement for-the DCCD.
2 96
When coupled with the notable lack of controversy over the Commerce
298Clause' 9' and the power of the Congress to lay and collect taxes, the
commercial restrictions expressed in the text of the Constitution provide a
solid textual foundation for the DCCD. The affirmative powers to lay taxes
and to regulate commerce, along with the concomitant restrictions placed
on the states, map onto the paradigm cases referred to time and again in,
inter alia, Madison's correspondence leading up to the Annapolis and the
Philadelphia Conventions, and in the state laws that caused him, and oth-
ers, so much concern.
One does not merely see one clause with one corresponding prohibi-
tion, but rather a clause with three direct restraints on state power. The new
government needed the ability to prescribe uniform commercial regula-
tions and to secure a source of revenue independent from the states.29 In
addition, it needed the authority to proscribe certain state actions, under-
taken during the Confederation period, which were harmful to the spirit
of the union-the discriminatory treatment by certain states toward the
commerce of their sister states. Hence, the Import-Export and Tonnage
Clauses were born.
This skein of powers and prohibitions related to commerce, in turn,
suggests that a much narrower range of power exists for the states to exer-
cise "concurrently" with the federal government. The explicit prohibitions
of Article I, Section io clearly prohibit states from securing local benefits
by imposing costs on interstate commerce. In light of the evidence pre-
sented above, then-professor Frankfurter's assumption that "an audacious
doctrine" like the DCCD "would hardly have been publicly avowed in
support of the adoption of the Constitution" and would have occasioned
vociferous opposition from those jealous of state sovereignty appears to be
incorrect and uninformed. Justice Scalia in turn adopted Frankfurter's
errors when he wrote that it is "beyond question that many 'apprehen-
sions' would have been 'entertained' if supporters of the Constitution had
296 See generally id. at 393-405 (describing problems attending substitution of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV for the DCCD).
297 The Commerce Clause passed unanimously without recorded debate. See 2
RECORDS, supra note 253, at 308 ("Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations &
[interstate commerce] agreed to nem. con.").
298 See id. at 3o8.
299 FARRAND, supra note 7o, at 5 ("Matters of commerce were inseparably associated
with those of finance and were at this time of equal moment.").
300 FRANKFURTER, supra note 256, at 19.
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hinted that the Commerce Clause, despite its language, gave this Court the
power it has since assumed."3 °' The evidence presented above points to a
conclusion that Justices Scalia and Frankfurter did not consider: that the
power to regulate commerce, and even to significantly restrain the states in
their regulations of interstate or foreign commerce, was not controversial
because most interested parties understood those limitations to be neces-
sary for the continued survival of the union.
VII. CONCLUSION: TEXT, HISTORY, AND THE DCCD
The apparent consensus in favor of limiting state commercial regulatory
power, while broad, was probably not very deep. As Professor Abel put it,
"[tihe prevailing tendency ... was to resort to characterization rather than
specification. '302 That there was still some uncertainty about what, exactly,
states were prohibited from doing is bolstered by his later surveys of state
laws in the quarter century before Gibbons v. Ogden, which show states en-
acting a variety of laws that to one degree or another affected or regulated
interstate commerce.30 3 Moreover, it was not entirely clear, in Philadelphia
or in the subsequent conventions, to whom the duty of policing the bound-
aries between federal and state governments would fall, though historian
Clinton Rossiter once opined that "[miost delegates, if asked their opinion,
would doubtless have said something about the authority of the Supreme
Court to declare obnoxious state laws 'null and void."'30 4 As it happened,
the Supreme Court soon either fulfilled the expectations of the Framers or
realized the Constitution's critics' worst fears-depending on one's point of
view-by claiming the power to "say what the law is" as part of its judicial
305power. It would be the Supreme Court, then, that would have to "imple-
ment" 3o6 what might now be called an "incompletely theorized"3 7 norm
301 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 264 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302 Abel, supra note 258, at 483.
303 See, e.g., Albert S. Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Trade and
Traffic(pts. I-2), 14 BROOK. L. REV. 38,215 (1947-48); Albert S. Abel, Commerce Regulation Before
Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Facilities, 25 N.C. L. REV. 121 (1946-47); Albert
S. Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Enterprise, 18
Miss. L.J. 335 (1946-47).
304 ROSSITER, supra note 218, at 18o.
305 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
306 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38 (2oo1). Fallon
explains that "'implementation' is a more aptly encompassing term than 'interpretation,'
capable of subsuming two conceptually distinctive functions: one of identifying constitutional
norms and specifying their meaning and another of crafting doctrine or developing standards
of review."
307 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996).
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that states ought not be able to discriminate against the commerce of other
states in the Union.
Slowly, haltingly, the Court did just that. By the 1870s, two lines of doc-
trine emerged: one is the familiar, tortured line addressing the extent to
which state regulation of commerce qua commerce was impermissible; 30 but
a second, separate category for state regulations that discriminated against
interstate commerce or interstate commercial actors also emerged.3 9 "As
the national economy became increasingly integrated in the years follow-
ing the Civil War, the Court began a conscious and increasingly aggressive
campaign to break down local barriers to interstate trade through a 'free-
trade' construction of the dormant Commerce Clause. 31 °
Improvements in transportation and the advent of mass-produced
goods marketed nationwide spawned state and local efforts to protect their
own producers and sellers, to raise revenue at the expense of out-of-staters,
or both.3 ' 2 Though similar exactions were not unheard of in earlier years,
308 An historical survey of the doctrinal evolution of the DCCD is beyond the scope
of this paper. Suffice it to say that the contortions in this branch of the DCCD arose from the
difficulties the early Court had in resolving the question of whether the Commerce Clause
had committed to Congress exclusively the power to regulate commerce. The Marshall Court
flirted with exclusivity in Gibbonsv. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824), and with a distinction
between "regulations" of commerce and "mere" exercises of the police powers. Willson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). Subsequent courts struggled with the
question whether the Commerce Clause independently limited state regulation or whether
power was, to some degree, concurrent absent congressional action. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: TE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 at 203-06,
222-30 (1985). By mid century, the Court was still struggling with this question, which was
answered, if imperfectly, by its Cooley decision, in which the Court announced that states
could regulate local subjects, while national subjects requiring a uniform rule were reserved
for Congress, whether or not it deigned to act. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1852); CURRIE, supra, at 230-34. Unfortunately, the Court provided little guidance for
distinguishing between national and local subjects, so the Cooley rule was gradually supplanted
by inquiry into whether a particular measure constituted a "direct" burden on interstate
commerce or was merely an "indirect" one. See BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION
OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.04 (1999). This test was itself criticized and was
replaced in the 194os with a frank balancing of local burdens against burdens to interstate
commerce-which survives today as "Pike balancing." The test is named for the case in
which it was announced, Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (197o). Barry Cushman
has described in detail how the fashioning and discarding of doctrinal tests was necessary
to prevent the irruption of a massive power vacuum occasioned by exclusion of states from
certain areas that, given the received wisdom regarding the scope of Congress's positive
commerce power, it was not at all clear the federal government could fill. Cushman, supra
note 257, at I io8-zo.
309 See CURRIE, supra note 308, at 404-05.
3!0 Cushman, supra note 257, at 1 io.
311 See generally James W. Ely, Jr., "The Railroad System Has Burst Through State Limits":
Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933 (2003).
312 See, e.g., VII CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, pt. 2, at 663-77 (1987); see id. at 664
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in 1876 the Court, expanding on earlier dicta condemning discriminatory
taxation,3 3 struck down a Missouri law that imposed a privilege tax on the
sale of out-of-state goods.3 4 Historian Charles Fairman commented that
the willingness to challenge "exactions of long standing... suggests a new
sense of nationalism to which the centennial decision in Welton gave ex-
pression.3 s 5 Over a century later this categorical approach survives, with
facially discriminatory taxes and regulations deemed "virtually per se" il-
legal and subject to strict scrutiny, as are facially neutral regulations with
discriminatory effects or motivated by protectionist purpose. The anti-
discrimination principle is also vigorously enforced through the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
At a minimum, the Supreme Court's use of the DCCD to eliminate
overt or covert commercial discrimination against interstate commerce and
commercial actors is entirely in keeping with the text of the Constitution-
which simultaneously delegated power to Congress and withdrew from
states powers to discriminate in the grant of commercial "privileges and
immunities" or to enact the types of regulations that had spawned abuses
during the Confederation era-and the intent of its drafters, as well as be-
ing consistent with the understanding of those who were called upon to
ratify the Constitution. The men who drafted the Constitution were inter-
ested in arresting extant abuses of state commercial power that the Articles
were powerless to stop. The centralization of commercial regulatory power
and the affirmative limitations on state power were largely (if not univer-
sally) understood to be necessary and benevolent. As one for whom text
and history are important, as are structure and precedent, I am satisfied
that the evidence furnishes no reason to criticize the DCCD for a lack of
either textual or historical pedigree. The evidence fatally undermines crit-
ics' main objections to the DCCD described in the introduction.
There are at least three other possible objections that one might lodge
against my conclusions. First, even in its current form, the DCCD extends
(describing advent of Singer sewing machines and state attempts to license sellers of out-of-
state products); see also 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
625 (1926) ("With the immense development of the railroad and telegraph systems of the
country, the increased facility for the doing of interstate business and the multiplication of
commercial corporations after the Civil War, [the Commerce Clause] of the Constitution began
to assume an importance in the history of the law which it had never before attained.").
313 See Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 140 (1869). I have criticized Woodruff
v. Parham elsewhere for its erroneous conclusion that the Import-Export Clause was intended
to apply only to foreign imports and exports. Denning,supra note 271, at 162-63. David Currie
argued that this was the first instance in which discrimination was employed by the Court to
assess the validity of a state measure under the Commerce Clause. CURRIE, supra note 308,
at 337-
314 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
315 FAIRMAN, supra note 312, at 666 (footnote omitted).
316 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 6 17, 624 (1978).
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beyond mere discrimination and potentially invalidates nondiscrimina-
tory regulations of commerce. Second, the current DCCD prohibits state
regulations beyond the immediate concerns of the Framers, who worried
primarily about financial levies on commerce-taxes, imposts, and the like.
Third, even if prohibitions on state power were effected by the grant of
commercial power to Congress, nothing in the Constitution authorizes aju-
dicialrole for striking down state laws that contravene that intended regula-
tory centralization.
A. Application of DCCD to Nondiscriminatory State Regulations
Despite Justice Scalia's urgings,3"7 the modern DCCD applies not only to
discriminatory regulations, but also to those regulations whose burdens on
interstate commerce are "clearly excessive in relation to the [regulations']
putative local benefits."', 8 The so-called Pike balancing test in large part
merely restated what the Court had been doing in nondiscriminatory cases
for some time.3 9 Even so, such balancing had long been criticized as an
improper arrogation of legislative duties.320 Such criticisms continue among
the DCCD's vocal critics.32" ' A critic might say that the evidence adduced
here does nothing to bolster the balancing tier of the DCCD and thus I
have done little, as the title promises, to "legitimate" the DCCD.
The simple answer is that the antidiscrimination branch of the DCCD
is responsible for the invalidation of state and local laws in the Supreme
Court and in the lower courts. According to one recent article, the Court
has not relied on Pike balancing in a DCCD case since the 1988 term."'
According to my count,323 in only eight cases in the last six years have lower
317 See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging limitation of DCCD to cases of
"rank discrimination").
318 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (970); see generally David S. Day,
Revisiting Pike: The Origins of the Nondiscrimination Tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,
27 HAMLINE L. REv. 45 (2004).
319 See, BITTKER,supra note 308, at § 6.05.
320 See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at
795-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 183
(1940) (Black, J., dissenting).
321 See supra note 2.
322 Day, supra note 318, at 49 & n.20.
323 Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim's Motorcycle, Inc., 4o F3 d 560, 570-74 (4th
Cir. 2005) (striking down a provision of Virginia law permitting motorcycle franchise holders
to protest intent to establish a competing franchise anywhere else in the state, triggering
requirement that manufacturer prove inadequate representation in the market); PSINET, Inc.
v. Chapman, 362 E 3 d 227, 240 (4th Cir. 2004) (divided court) (striking down Virginia statute
prohibiting use of Internet to display or provide access to offensive materials by juveniles;
burdens on interstate commerce clearly excessive compared to local benefits); Alliant Energy
Corp. v. Bie, 303 F3d 904, 919 (7th Cir. 2003) (striking down Wisconsin statute requiring that
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federal courts used Pike balancing to strike down state regulations, though
many Pike challenges have been brought and rejected.324 Thus, whether
or not Professor Regan's provocative thesis-that even when courts apply
Pike balancing, they are really looking for protectionist purpose -is true
or not, it is clear that the courts themselves have of late wielded the DCCD
primarily as a sword against discriminatory and protectionist state legisla-
tion.
Despite the reluctance of courts to invalidate non-discriminatory, yet
arguably burdensome, state laws under Pike, I am not as sure as I once
was that some balancing of national and local interests is inappropriate,
even for courts. The evidence assembled by Professor Abel tends to sup-
port the idea that the Framers had some notion that the grant of power
utilities holding companies be incorporated in the state of Wisconsin; concluding that burden
on interstate commerce outweighs any local benefits, but upholding provision prohibiting
transfer of utility license to foreign corporation and provisions regarding take-over of
utilities); R & M Oil & Supply, Inc. v. Saunders, 307 F3d 73I, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2002) (striking
down Missouri law requiring bulk propane sellers to maintain-but not necessarily to fill or
use-an 18,ooo-gallon storage tank in the state; burden on interstate commerce excessive as
compared to de minimis local benefits); S.E. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 E Supp. 2d
773, 786-88 (D.S.C. zoo5) (holding that a South Carolina statute prohibiting dissemination
of material "harmful to minors" over the Internet is invalid "because the burdens that it
imposes on interstate commerce are excessive in relation to the local benefit conferred"); Ctr.
for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 E Supp. 2d 606, 662 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (striking down
state law requiring Internet service providers to remove or disable access to child pornography
either stored on or available through its service; little evidence law is effective while "there
is evidence that this Act places a substantial burden on interstate commerce"); Kraft Foods
N. Am., Inc. v. Rockland Co. Dep't Weights & Measures, No. o Civ. 6980 (WHP), 2003 WL
554796, at *8-io (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2003) (striking down county's method of enforcing state
food labeling requirements that required weights on packages to meet or exceed weight on
box under Pike balancing); Dakota, Minnesota & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp.
zd 989, 1020-24 (D.S.D. 2002) (striking down part of state statute requiring railroad have
financial resources necessary to complete expansion project to exercise power of eminent
domain). Two other district courts whose decisions invoked Pike to invalidate state laws
were later overturned. See Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, i 13 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146-51 (D. Mass.
2000) (striking down Massachusetts statute requiring tobacco companies to file disclosure
statements detailing ingredients and nicotine yield of cigarettes), rev'd 267 F3d 45 (Ist Cir.
2002) (withdrawn from bound volume at the request of the court); Nat'l Elec. Mfg. Ass'n
v. Sorrell, 77 F Supp. 2d 449, 450, 454-55 (D. Vt. 1999) (enjoining enforcement of Vermont
statute forbidding sale of items containing mercury without warning label), rev'd 272 E3d I03
(2d Cir. 2001).
324 For cases in which Pike challenges were rected, see BORIS I. BITTKER & BRANNON
P. DENNING, BIr-KER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 2005
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT § 6.05, at 132-39 (2005). See also BORIS I. BITTKER & BRANNON
P. DENNING, BITIKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 2006
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT § 6.05 (forthcoming).
325 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986) ("In the central area of dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence.... the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing
states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism.").
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to Congress of commercial regulatory power (which Abel argues was un-
derstood to be of relatively narrow scope) excluded the states from that326
area. Moreover, note the absence in the text of Article I, Section I0 of any
mention of "discriminatory" tonnage fees or "discriminatory" imposts and
duties on imports and exports. One might conclude, as the Court once held,
that states were prohibited from levying any kind of burden whatsoever on
327
any "interstate commerce" that passed through its borders. Clearly, as
others have shown, that would have deprived the states of a great deal of
revenue, just as any total exclusion of states from regulation of "interstate
commerce"-given how that concept has expanded over the years-would
have hobbled states' historical police powers.
Though it is true that The Federalist No. 32 did not list the commerce
power among those powers given exclusively to Congress, it did note that
power was denied to states when their exercise of it would be "repugnant"
to the national plan.32 Chief Justice Marshall surely followed Hamilton,
and perhaps anticipated Cooley, when he concluded that the paradigmatic
"concurrent[]" power-that of taxation--could not be exercised by states
in a manner contrary to the purpose of the Union.329 If one of the purposes
of placing power over commerce in Congress included promoting unifor-
mity and consistency, Pike balancing, then, is merely the latest attempt to
give substance to Justice Curtis's intuitively appealing distinction between
"national" subjects for which one rule should prevail and "local" subjects
that could tolerate varied local rules.33 ° To criticize the way in which the
Court has implemented this norm is not the same as proving that the norm
was invented by later courts or otherwise violated the expectations of those
who wrote or enacted the Constitution.
B. Expansion of DCCD to Cover Regulations
Of course, the DCCD has been wielded against measures that involve regu-
lations as opposed to literal imposts, duties, fees, or other taxes.33' Justice
326 See Abel, supra note 258, at 432.
327 Brown v. Maryland, z5 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (suggesting tax immunity for
goods in interstate commerce that were still in their original packages). But tee Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (rejecting the original-package doctrine).
328 ThE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198-200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
329 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 3 16, 425 (1819).
330 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852).
331 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 5' i U.S. 383 (1994) (invalidating
local "flow control" ordinance prohibiting export of solid waste and requiring disposal at town-
operated facility); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) (striking down state statute
requiring coal-fired electric plants to burn coal containing at least ten-percent in-state coal);
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (presenting a DCCD challenge to
anti-takeover statute); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (state ban on the importation of
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Stevens recently wrote that while "[tihe paradigmatic example of a law
discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective tariff or cus-
toms duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax
similar products produced in State," such tariffs "are so patently uncon-
stitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by any State to enact
one. Instead, the cases are filled with state laws that aspire to reap some of
the benefits of tariffs by other means., 332 Has the Court's extension of the
DCCD to regulations-even the antidiscrimination principle-rendered
the doctrine suspect or caused it to slip too far from its textual and histori-
cal moorings?
I am hard-pressed to see how. Forbidding only the modern tax equiv-
alents of "imposts" and "duties" or "duties of tonnage" and permitting,
for example, a state regulation requiring that all in-state goods destined
for export be subject to some in-state processing requirement would be a
triumph of form over substance. 33  To permit states merely to repackage
discriminatory taxes as burdensome or expensive regulations and employ
them to enrich their own trade at their neighbors' expense, with all of the
attendant injury to interstate relations and cycles of retaliation, would fatal-
ly undermine what was the key purpose for centralizing trade regulation.
Moreover, the language of the Constitution itself supports the Court's
extension. Article I, Section 8 grants the power to regulate "commerce"
among the states, not just the power to standardize tariffs. Similarly, the
term privileges and immunities in Article IV, Section 2, and the earlier Article
of Confederation provision from which it was derived, seems to sweep
more broadly than a simple guarantee against burdensome taxes.
Finally, when it comes to the elimination of barriers to trade that so
worried the Framers, the Court, as Alexander Bickel put it, has been "no re-
specter of disguise." 334 There is venerable precedent that counsels against
baitfish challenged under DCCD); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (striking down
state restrictions on exportation of groundwater to neighboring states); Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating state labeling requirements); H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (striking down ban on importation of milk
at lower than state-approved prices); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 16o (1941) (striking down
California law prohibiting the importation of "indigents"); Baldwin v. G.A.F Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511 (1935); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (striking down in-
state processing requirement for shrimp caught in local waters).
332 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (994).
333 It was on this "form-over-substance" ground that I criticized Justice Thomas's
suggestion to scrap the DCCD, replace it with judicial enforcement of the Import-Export
Clause, but restrict the Import-Export Clause's enforcement to those state taxes that were
literally the imposts and duties forbidden by the clause. Justice Thomas never articulated a
difference between those taxes and other sorts of discriminatory regulations, other than by
adverting to the text's use of "imposts" and "duties," see Denning, supra note 27 1, at 215-23,
and implying that if that is all the text covered, then he had no authority to read those at a
higher level of abstraction.
334 IX ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
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wooden literalism in the reading of these provisions. The Court, interpret-
. 33 33b
ing both the Import-Export Clause" as well as the Tonnage Clause, has
enforced those provisions with regard for their intended purpose, casting
a chary eye on state attempts to evade the literal language of the provi-
sions. 337 The evolution of the DCCD's scope is at least as reasonable.
By extending the scope of DCCD to regulations as well as taxation
the Court has taken no more liberty than when it extended the First
338Amendment to all branches of the government, not just Congress, or to
certain forms of symbolic conduct,339 or when the Fourth Amendment's
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-21, at 568
(1984).
335 When California imposed a tax on bills of lading for gold and silver to be shipped
anywhere out of the state, Chief Justice Taney struck it down under the Import-Export Clause
despite the fact that the tax was not literally on the gold and silver itself. Almy v. California,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861). "If the tax was laid on the gold or silver exported," wrote Taney,
"every one would see that it was repugnant" to the Clause. Id. at 173. The question was
whether the indirect nature of the tax insulated it from the strictures of the Clause. For Taney,
it did not: "[A] tax or duty on a bill of lading, although differing in substance from a duty on
the article shipped, is in substance the same thing." Id. at 174.
336 In 1867, the Supreme Court struck down a flat fee imposed by the City of New
Orleans on ships entering the Port of New Orleans as a violation of the Tonnage Clause.
See Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867). Despite the fact that the tax
was not levied on the carrying capacity of the ship, Chief Justice Chase held that the Clause
prohibited not only "a pro rata tax" but "any duty on the ship, whether a fixed sum upon
its whole tonnage, or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of tonnage with the
rate of duty." Id. at 34-35. If the Clause were interpreted "in this restricted sense," i.e., only
forbidding apro rata imposition, it "would not fully accomplish its intent." Id.
337
It is a just and well-settled doctrine ... that a State cannot do that
indirectly what she is forbidden... to do directly. If she cannot levy a
duty or tax from the master or owner of a vessel engaged in commerce
graduated on the tonnage or admeasurement of the vessel, she cannot
effect the same purpose by merely changing the ratio, and graduating it
on the number of masts, or of mariners, the size or power of the steam-
engine, or the number of passengers which she carries.
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,458-59 (1849).
338 Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law") (emphasis added)
with N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (97) (per curiam) (holding that the First
Amendment applies to the executive branch).Seealso DANIELA. FARBER,TH14E FIRSTAMENDMENT
I (2d. ed. 2003) (noting that "free expression is also protected against abridgement by the
President and the federal courts."); Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment,
80 Nw. U. L. REV. I I56 (1987) (discussing the evolution of First Amendment protection from
Congress to other branches).
339 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that burning the American
flag was expressive activity protected by the First Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (applying First Amendment to jacket emblazoned with message opposing the draft);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that First Amendment
protects right to wear armbands symbolizing opposition to Vietnam War); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (discussing First Amendment protection for symbolic speech).
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protections of "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures" are held to keep pace with the advance of technolo-
gy. If there is a difference between these examples of stretching language
to enforce a constitutional principle, and the evolution of the DCCD, it is
not apparent, and the DCCD's critics ought to explain it.
C. Lack of Authorityfora Judiial Role
Finally, the claim exists that whatever limits the Commerce Clause did or
did not place on states, it is for Congress, not the federal courts, to enforce
those limitations.34' The Commerce Clause, critics point out, says noth-
ing about being enforced by courts.M 2 This criticism misses the mark for
two reasons. First, it proves too much. The Constitution says precious little
about an affirmative judicial role in enforcing any of the Constitution's pro-
visions; yet, judicial review has survived-thrived, really- for two centu-
ries. Moreover, while the Constitution does not specifically mention judi-
cial review, the possibility of judicial enforcement was clearly on the minds
of the Framers and was feared by the Constitution's opponents.
Second, the "no-judicial-power-to-enforce" argument focuses too nar-
rowly on the Commerce Clause as the sole source of the principles em-
bodied in the DCCD. Consider the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2: nothing in that provision explicitly mentions judicial
enforcement either, yet Justice Scalia and other DCCD critics support it
as the locus for judicial enforcement of the nondiscrimination principle.
The provisions of Article I, Section io-clearly meant to limit states-also
contain no provision for their enforcement, but would be useless without
court enforcement. The defense that I have offered above avoids the need
to rely on a specific piece of text. Both the grant of power to regulate com-
merce and the corresponding restrictions on states were made for a pur-
pose, evidenced not in a single clause but in an interrelated set of grants
and restrictions, and the Court has enforced those purposes fairly consis-
tently through the DCCD. If critics were consistent, one might expect they
would be equally bothered by other structural restrictions, like sovereign
immunity or the "anticommandeering principle," which are built upon
340 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing security in "persons, houses, papers,
and effects" against "unreasonable searches and seizures"), with Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (i967) (extending Fourth Amendment
protection to conversations intercepted by wiretaps).
341 See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the "lack of any clear
theoretical underpinning for judicial 'enforcement' of the Commerce Clause," which is "[o]n
its face ... a charter for Congress, not the courts"). Id. at 260.
342 See id.
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slight textual evidence, but which are nevertheless vigorously enforced by
the present Court.
Finally, it is worth pointing out, as Jim Chen did recently, 3 that
Congress has had the power for nearly 150 years to halt judicial enforce-
ment of the DCCD through the use of its affirmative commerce power.
That it has chosen to do so very rarely suggests at least an indifference to, if
not acquiescence in, the judicial role that even Justice Scalia has conceded
is tantamount to "intellectual adverse possession.'344
343 Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: CongressionalAcquiescence and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1784 (2004). But see Norman Williams, Why Congress May Not
Overruk the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153 (zooS).
344 Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 265 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
2oo5-2oo6]

